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Commentators on insider trading are divided into two camps, one in favor of 
regulation, the other in favor of deregulation. The arguments for the two positions 
are manifold but not irreconcilable. I show that important gains to social welfare 
come with insider trading on negative information (sales), whereas losses often 
result from the use of positive information (purchases). Thus, I look at a regulation 
that allows insiders to use negative but not positive non-public information. 
Because positive information will be disclosed much sooner than negative 
information, the marginal incentive (and marginal gain to social welfare, 
respectively) of insider trading as a disclosure mechanism is greater for sales than 
for purchases. Likewise, stock bubbles generally occur in terms of overvaluations, 
not undervaluations, emphasizing the importance of insider trading on negative 
information as a deterrent. The case law on insider trading has long since 
recognized the distinction between the two types of information, a fact that 
commentators have either neglected or criticized. A reinterpretation allows me to 
reconcile presumed contractions of the case law. My analysis also explains 
empirical data suggesting that insider trading involves more selling than buying, 
while enforcement actions focus on purchasing activity.
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I Introduction
Since the 1960’s, insider trading has been subject to an extensive scholarly debate1 and has 
led to controversial decisions by the Supreme Court.2 Recent corporate scandals have called
for a re-evaluation of the debate. Specifically, new insights into speculative stock bubbles
may shed a different light on the issue of insider trading, deviating sharply from the two main 
regimes proposed and discussed so far.3 Because stock prices were long viewed as close to 
fundamental values, the benefits of insider trading to the accuracy of stock prices were
underestimated. This underestimation, however, does not suggest a complete deregulation, 
permitting insider trading generally. Rather, distortions have turned out to be more likely on 
the upside, resulting in the emergence of overvaluations (“positive stock bubbles”). This 
involves a variety of issues that are currently debated in a different context, including 
performance-based compensation and excessive pay. Because there may, at times, exist few 
incentives to eliminate overvaluations, I emphasize the importance of insider trading on 
negative information, as opposed to insider trading on positive information. More generally, 
negative information is kept secret longer than positive information. Thus, the marginal 
incentive of insider trading for the distribution of information is greater with regard to 
negative information than with regard to positive information. Closely related, insider trading 
prohibitions support collusive agreements among insiders to conceal negative information. 
They provide the conspirators with sanctions for deviating behavior (i.e. trading on the bad 
1
 E.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); Frank Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary 
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309; Stephen Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: 
A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35 (1986). For useful summaries of the debate, see generally Charles C. 
Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 353 (1988); Boyd Kimball Dyer, Economic 
Analysis, Insider Trading, and Game Markets, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1.
2 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997). Recently, the European Union has again emphasized the importance of this issue; see the directive 2003/6/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of January 28, 2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 
replacing the directive 89/592/EEC of November 13, 1989; compare Jürgen Noll & Martin Klimscha, Über die Sinnhaftigkeit 
der Bestrafung von Insidergeschäften, 2005 ÖSTERREICHISCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 658.
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news) of their co-conspirators, namely with the possibility to report them to the SEC, and thus 
allow to enforce illegal agreements.
I focus on the distinction between positive and negative information in reinterpreting the case 
law, arguing that it is more coherent than most commentators allege.4 In particular, our 
analysis provides a useful tool to understand Dirks and explains how it is reconciled with 
preceding (e.g. TGS) and subsequent (e.g. O’Hagan) cases.5 These cases suggest that insider 
trading on negative information has a greater social value than insider trading on positive 
information, which is coherent with our efficiency analysis. In fact, common law sanctions 
against insider trading that were based on a breach of fiduciary duties have quite naturally 
relied on the same distinction. With this analysis I challenge the traditional positions that 
focus on the two extremes, 6 the view that insider trading shall be prohibited where 
informational advantages are the largest7 and research that emphasizes efficiencies of insider 
trading on positive information8.
The contemporary debate generally agrees on the goal of improving liquidity and efficiency 
of the capital market.9  (1) Deregulators, i.e. opponents of the current prohibition,10 suggest 
3 The discussion often includes the two extremes: prohibiting insider trading on positive and negative information without prior 
disclosure of non-public information and allowing insider on positive and negative information without prior disclosure of 
non-public disclosure.
4 Daniel R. Fischel, An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (1984); Jill 
E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179 (1991); A.C. 
Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B. U. L. 
REV. 13 (1998); for further literature see note 227.
5
 S footnotes 216 and 217.
6
 See footnotes 9-20 and accompanyin g text.
7 Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322-
367 (1979-1980).
8 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders’ Reaction to Opportunities to “Waste” 
Corporate Value, NBER Technical Working Papers No. 95, argue contrary to our theory that insider trading on positive 
information should be allowed and insider trading on negative information prohibited; compare also James P. Jalil, Proposals 
for Insider Trading Regulation After the Fall of the House of Enron, 8 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 689, 714 (2003) (“It would 
… be interesting to see if senior managers better managed for the long term interests of the stockholders if they could not sell 
their securities until the earlier of their retirement or five years after they were no longer employed. It may be argued that 
American corporations would be managed far differently, and perhaps far more prudently.”) For further literature see footnote 
43.
9 See Zohar Goshen, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 78 VA. L. REV 1229, 1230
(2001) in the given context.
10 MANNE, supra note 1; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1. 
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that insider trading causes information to be transmitted more quickly to the market and 
thereby enhances efficiency of stock prices. This is a gain to social welfare because the 
economy’s resources can be better allocated. Reduced uncertainty increases the firm’s value
to investors and lowers the firm’s cost of capital.11 Insider trading enhances the market for 
corporate control because investors can better evaluate management performance.12 Incentive-
based compensation through equity interests becomes a more efficient tool.13 Insider trading 
partly replaces disclosure duties at a lower cost.14 Insofar as wealth may be redistributed, 
insider trading opportunities will be priced in the compensation, resulting in a lower salary 
when insider trading is permitted.15 Moreover, it has been asserted that insider trading aligns
the interests of risk averse managers with less risk averse shareholders because trading 
opportunities give managers more incentives to engage in riskier projects.16 These arguments 
were conventionally considered to hold true for insider trading on positive and negative
information. (2) Regulators, i.e. proponents of the current regulation, believe that insiders 
systematically outperform the market and thus would drive outside information traders out of 
the market.17 Outside information traders might have incentives to invest in industry-related 
and general market information but would refrain from dealing with firm-specific 
information. With much the same concern, commentators have alleged fairness arguments to 
11
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 10, 866- 872.
12
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 10, 867.
13
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 10, 867.
14 Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets and the Dog that Did Not Bark (March 22, 2005) ExpressO 
Preprint Series. Working Paper 545 (http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/545) reminds us that prohibiting insider trading 
comes with costs of sanctions (“… conclusion that the practice should be outlawed and policed (efficiently? and at what other 
costs?) by public authorities …”); compare also Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 25-27 (1980) .
15 MANNE, supra note 1, chs. 8-10.
16
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 10, 869.
17
 E.g. Goshen, supra note 9, at 1238 et seq, 1241 relying on Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider trading and 
the efficiency of stock prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 110 (1992) (showing that the number of outside information traders 
declines as a function of the relative precision of the insiders' information) and Hayne E. Leland, Insider Trading: Should It 
Be Prohibited?, 100 J. POL. ECON. 859, 883-85 (1992) (showing that the welfare of outside information traders declines when 
insiders are trading). See also Bagehot (Jack Treynor), The Only Game in Town, 27 FIN. ANAL. J. 12-13 (March/April 1971)
(showing that in a world with informed traders, market makers, liquidity traders, market makers will lose to informed traders). 
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show that outsiders would no longer invest in the market on unfair conditions.18 Another set 
of arguments deals with compensation, managerial incentives, and productive efficiency. 
Insiders would delay the transmission of information which is crucial if the information has to 
go through a number of levels in the firm before it reaches the decision makers.19 These 
arguments were advanced against insider trading on positive and negative information.20
In order to understand what kind of information the benefits and disadvantages of insider
trading are attributed to, I create a simple hypothetical scenario, reflected in the case law21: 
Insiders may trade on negative inside information but not on positive inside information. Non-
public information can be classified into positive and negative information, according to its 
effect, if disclosed. That is, if disclosure would increase the stock price it is positive 
information; if it would lead to a decline it is negative information.22 This approach allows us
to connect gains and losses to either selling or purchasing activity. As we will see, alleged 
disadvantages of insider trading involve positive information, while important advantages 
refer to insider trading on negative information. The hypothetical might explain why insider 
selling exceeds purchasing, while at the same time, most of the enforcement actions by the 
SEC refer to purchasing activity. Because insider trading on negative information is less 
harmful (or more beneficial) to arbitrageurs than trading on positive information, informal 
restrictions are more likely to be imposed on profits from insider purchasing.
In the next section, I discuss the fundamentals of disclosure duties and apply them to insider 
trading as a mechanism of distributing information (II). Then, through the hypothetical, I trace 
18
 See e.g. Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119; for more literature see Dyer, supra note 1, 
at footnote 5 and below footnote 119.
19
 See Bainbridge, supra note 1, 50. See furthermore below footnote 119.
20 Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM 
AND MARY L. REV. 1289, 1343- 44 (1998) (arguing the distinction between buyers and sellers has never been important in the 
insider trading context). For a comprehensive overview of the literature see also e.g. Bainbridge, supra note 1 and Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Insider trading, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL III (THE REGULATION OF CONTRACTS) 5650, at 
772-812 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
21
 See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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gains and losses of insider trading to either positive or negative information (III). Having laid 
out the underlying framework, I look at the basic economics of stock bubbles and apply these
insights to our hypothetical scenario. I discuss herding behavior, fund managers’ incentives, 
the role of analysts, short sale restraints and the inherent difference between positive stock 
bubbles (overvaluations) and negative stock bubbles (undervaluations) in order to show that 
the firms are more likely to be overvalued (IV). From the insight gained though this analysis, I 
review the tenets of the insider trading debate and apply them to our hypothetical situation 
(V). A separate section is dedicated to examining the presumed distortion of incentives that is
caused by the fact that insider are allowed to trade on negative information (VI). I review
empirical evidence (VII) and argue how the case law could be interpreted consistent with our 
analysis. Focusing on modern insider trading cases with an eye on early antecedents, I show 
that the law, as understood by the Supreme Court, is more socially optimal than previously 
thought (VIII). I briefly discuss the option of self-regulaton (IX) and then, I conclude (IX).
II Disclosure duties and insider trading
II.a Positive and negative information in contract law
Insider trading is a mechanism for distributing information, so it is worthwhile to look at the 
economics of disclosure duties. In contract law, efficiency analyses traditionally distinguish 
between sellers and buyers as to whether or not a disclosure duty applies. (1) If sellers had 
negative information which they were not legally bound to disclose about a good that they 
wanted to sell, information asymmetry would result in an adverse selection problem. Buyers 
would anticipate potential negative information about the good they wanted to purchase and 
thus would demand a lower price. Sellers would anticipate this anticipation and not offer 
22 Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, 
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goods with a value above this anticipated value, and so on.23 A disclosure duty may be one 
possible way of circumventing this market failure.24 (2) If buyers had positive information 
about a good they wanted to purchase and the law imposed a duty to disclose such 
information, they would have no incentive to produce the information in the first place. 
A mining company that is searching for minerals and willing to purchase property found to 
contain minerals has an interest not to disclose the information before making an offer. If it 
had to disclose the information, it could not recoup the search costs; and thus, the company
had no incentives to produce the information in the first place.25 The same is true for the mere 
distribution of information if someone finds out information accidentally. To the extent, 
however, that positive information would become known anyway (foreknowledge), the 
production and distribution of information by the buyers has little or no social value, thus a 
disclosure duty would be efficient. It would deter the buyer from incurring costs to produce 
information that is merely redistributive. Roughly stated, economic analyses suggest that 
disclosure duties are efficient for sellers26 but not necessarily for buyers.27
in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 180 (F. Edwards ed., 1979).
23
 Compare George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons", Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Q. J. ECON. 488 
(1970).
24
 This, of course, assumes that courts are able to sanction breaches of disclosure duties. If this is not possible (or disclosure 
duties do not exist), sellers cannot credibly commit to telling the truth and buyers would have to invest in obtaining 
information that sellers already posses. This would be a loss to social welfare; e.g. Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: 
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, VA. L. REV. 117, 137 (1982).
25
 See also SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 and Fn 12. Historically, the common law was quite clear on this fact, 
see Dalley, supra note 20, at 1290; see also Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Deceit, 1790-1860: Continuity Amidst Change, 39 
AM. J. L. HIST. 405 (1995).
26
 Whether this should be (mandatory) law is primarily a question of transaction costs. A closer analysis may include other 
factors, like the seller’s costs of producing information etc, e.g. Joseph Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the 
Unraveling Result, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 91 (Grieson ed., 1986).
27
 For a more detailed analysis see e.g. Steven Shavell, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. 
ECON. 20-36 (1994). For a recent summary of the discussion see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 1645 (2003); with regard to contract law and insider trading see Levmore, supra note 24, who uses the term
“optimal dishonesty” (p. 140).
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II.b Efficiencies of insider trading on negative information
At first blush, the case described in the previous section seems to resemble a situation of a 
manager selling shares of his own company. A buyer would anticipate that the shares are
worth less than the market value due to non-public information the manager has. To eliminate
this information asymmetry, the insider would need to be subject to a duty to disclose the 
information before selling. On the other hand, if the insider knows positive, non-public 
information, trading profits would incentivize him to purchase the shares, thus realizing both 
personal and social gains. This seems to run counter to my efficiency arguments, under which 
insiders may sell but not purchase, absent disclosure.28
To get a better picture of the difference between disclosure duties in contract law and 
disclosure duties in corporate insider trading, we first look at the two arguments (adverse 
selection and incentives for the production of information), and then emphasize a third, 
arguably more important factor. First, in the corporate context, adverse selection translates 
into wider bid-ask spread. Investors discount the price for potential negative information 
when purchasing stock because the shares may be offered by an insider with superior 
information, resulting in a loss to outside traders.29 This additional “cost of trading” was 
alleged to be a loss to social welfare because some investments would not be undertaken and 
the market would be provided with less liquidity. Even though intuitively plausible, a 
correlation between insider trading and a wider bid-ask spread has been called into question.30
The fact that insiders also provide additional liquid ity renders the overall effect unclear.31 This 
is supported by some of the empirical evidence that finds no significant correlation between 
insider trading and an increase in the bid-ask spread.32 Moreover, a wider bid-ask spread is 
28
 For a comparison of contract law with insider trading see Levmore, supra note 24.
29
 Likewise, this applies to selling because insiders may have positive information. See also below p. 31.
30
 See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider trading and the bid-ask spread: a critical evaluation of adverse selection in the market 
setting, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83 (2004).
31 MANNE, supra note 1, at 7-8.
32
 See Dolgopolov, supra note 30, with an extensive discussion of empirical evidence.
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not necessarily socially suboptimal because it deters speculative trading. This idea has been 
articulated by Keynes33 and led others to propose a securities transaction tax.34
Secondly, in the corporate context, positive information is likely to be produced and published 
even if insider trading is prohibited. In fact, in order to set incentives for the production of 
positive information, people investing in the production must have a right to the benefits. This 
idea is captured by the business opportunity doctrine.35 Thus, to prohibit insider trading may 
in some cases enhance the production of positive information, consistent with the economics 
of contract law.36
The third and arguably more important factor in capital markets is the distribution of 
information and its effects on the informational efficiency. Positive information is likely to be 
disclosed even without insider trading whereas negative information may be kept secret for a 
relatively long period. Managers (and agents, in general) can, at least to some extent, control 
what and when information will become public. Since their interests are not entirely aligned 
with the interests of the shareholders, managers will not necessarily opt for a disclosure 
system that benefits the firm. Rather, they maximize their own benefits. 37  Due to 
performance-based compensation and the threat of being ousted in the course of a hostile 
takeover, managers generally favor overvaluation to undervaluation. Hence, they prefer 
disclosing positive information, while concealing negative information.38
33 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 155-160 (1936).
34
 See Dolgopolov, supra note 30, at 101-02 and Fn 103 for a discussion and further literature on securities transfer taxes.
35 Investors place a higher value on business opportunities than managers because investors are diversified; see DeLarme R. 
Landes, Economic Efficiency of the Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: In Defense of a Contextual Disclosure Rule, 74 TEMP. 
L. REV. 837, 853-54 (2001); for a more general discussion of the issue see Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of 
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980).
36
 See below with regard to the corporate opportunity doctrine (see below footnotes 188, 223, 254 and accompanying text). Of 
course, this argument by itself does not require a mandatory prohibition.
37
 Even if the interests were fully aligned, i.e. the managers would opt for a disclosure system that is in the best interests of the 
shareholders, it would not be socially optimal; Merritt B. Fox, Retaining mandatory securities disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
is not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). See also below p. 45.
38
 Ross, supra note 22, at 184 -185. Generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation: 
A Response to Critics, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001), 358-359; Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2001), 595; Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs if “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, DUKE L. J. 977, 1028- 29 (1992) . In greater detail Fox, supra note 37. Of course, disclosure of negative information can 
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Generally speaking, bad news has a negative impact on a manager’s reputation, which lowers 
his value on the labor market and has additional negative social consequences. 39  Social 
recognition –to a certain degree- depends on economic success, which is measured by one’s 
performance and compensation at work.40 One’s sense of self-esteem will naturally be higher 
if one reaches his goals. Consequently, monetary as well as non-monetary considerations 
support conventional wisdom that managers are more likely to disclose good news than bad 
news.41
Since positive information is made public fairly quickly anyway and negative information is 
kept secret for a relatively long time, there are good arguments for prohibiting insider trading 
on positive information only. The marginal incentive, and thus the marginal utility, of insider 
trading on positive information for the distribution of such information would be relatively
low, whereas the marginal incentive and utility of insider trading on negative information 
would be relatively high, given equal incentives from disclosure duties.42 Thus, contrary to 
earlier work, 43 our analysis suggests that insider trading should be allowed where the 
have benefits to the firm, since non-disclosure might be valued as bad news (Ross, supra note 22, 186-187). However, in the 
case of non-disclosure there is always a probability that no information has been produced at all, so that the probability of 
existing bad news will be somewhat lower (for non-disclosure) than if bad news were actually disclosed.
39 Compare e.g. Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 1999 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113, footnote 3,
who refers to “public reputation” and “sense of self-worth”.
40
 See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687 (2002) for a general 
discussion of non-pecuniary incentives.
41
 Compare Ross, supra note 22, 185-187; Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 801, 810-11 (1980) .
42
 A similar point is made by Harrison Hong, Terence Lim & Jeremy Stein, Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, 
and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies, 55 J. FIN. 265, 268 (2000) who conduct an empirical analysis. However, Hong 
et al focus on a different issue: because bad news travels more slowly, the “marginal contribution of outside analysts in 
getting the news out is likely to be greater when the news is bad”. [emphasis added]
43
 Brudney, supra note 7, at 322, 353 et seq, 354, 357, 359, 360 argues that the law should bar transactions where an insider 
“possess an informational advantage that the public investor may not lawfully overcome, regardless of their diligence or 
resources”. It shall be noted that Brudney uses a slightly different definition of “informational advantage”; Marcel Kahan, 
Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, DUKE L. J. 977, 1023- 24 (1992) . Bebchuk and Fershtman, 
supra note 8, argue that only insider trading on negative information should be prohibited (this result is driven by the fact that 
the authors focus on the incentive effect on investment decisions); see also Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) Fn 221, and Levmore, supra note 24, at 149 who imply that 
insider trading on positive information is better than insider trading on negative information. However, this statement is made 
only with regard to incentives for investment decisions. The same argument is made by WOLFGANG KRAUEL, INSIDERHANDEL 
40 (2000) and implicitly made by MARTIN OPPITZ, INSIDERRECHT AUS ÖKONOMISCHER PERSPEKTIVE 64 (2003)
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outsiders’ “informational disadvantage” of the outsiders is the largest, not the other way 
round.
Of course, the questions, as to when exactly the information with and without insider trading 
becomes known, and what the precise social value of an earlier disclosure due to insider 
trading is, remains open. Accordingly, the primary objective of this paper is to show that 
insider trading on negative information has a higher social value than trading on positive 
information. This allows us to advance arguments as to why a regulation that permits insider 
trading on negative information (only) may be more efficient. One way to think of it is, that –
assuming our arguments are correct- the expected social welfare is greater in our hypothetical 
than the average of the expected social welfare of (1) a system that allows insider trading on 
both positive and negative information and (2) a system that prohibits it for both positive and 
negative information. That is, if we assume, with a probability of 50%,44 that the current 
prohibition is better than to allow insider trading entirely and vice versa , we are better off with 
a rule that only prohibits insider trading on negative information.45
III Our hypothetical and potential objections
In some cases, managers are incentivized by disclosure duties to publish bad news, in other 
cases they may not. An important issue is whether disclosure duties are a more costly 
mechanism for distributing information than insider trading.46 An analysis of the costs of 
44
 Of course, there is no way of knowing that the probability is 0.5. It shall simply reflect the fact that the current discourse is 
divided, with arguments in favor and contra insider trading appearing equally appealing. The assumption is not essential to the
analysis.
45
 This is true, everything else equal (e.g. policing costs). Of course, one has to take into account, as will be discussed below, that 
the negative incentive effect of allowing insider trading on negative information (managers may take harmful investment 
decisions for trading opportunities) may cause the costs of insider trading on negative information to exceed the costs of 
insider trading on positive information. As we will see, the negative effect is likely to be weak.
46
 Compare Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 630; Carlton & Fischel, supra n ote 1, at 868 mention that some information 
may not credibly be disclosed. Marleen A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: the Repeal of 
Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 354 (1989) mentions the idea that soft information will not be disclosed because of 
fear of liability.
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disclosure duties and a comparison of those costs with the costs of insider trading goes
beyond the scope of this paper. For the present purposes it suffices to emphasize two 
comparative disadvantages of disclosure duties: First, disclosure duties as a negative incentive 
require costly enforcement actions, whereas positive incentives through insider trading are
self-enforcing. Second, negative incentives face the issue of wealth restraints, especially when 
detection is difficult. Efficient deterrence requires the sanction to equal the expected benefits. 
If the probability of detection is very low, as seems to be the case in the current context, the 
sanction will exceed the wealth restraints of the violator and deterrence will be lower than 
socially optimal.47 Thus, one has to set positive incentives in order for information to be 
disclosed. The observation that negative news is not always made public, as demonstrated in 
cases like Enron,48 is consistent with the problems mentioned.
The central question is then: when would the information become public without insider 
trading? The sooner information would become public without insider trading, the lower the 
marginal utility of allowing insider trading. On the other hand, the later information would be 
made public, the greater the marginal utility of insider trading is as an additional disclosure 
mechanism.
Our hypothetical allows insiders to trade on negative inside information and bars them from 
trading on positive inside information; that is, insiders may profit from the use of non-public 
information that would lead to a decline (but not an increase) in the stock price. Because 
insiders typically have incentives to disclose positive news and conceal negative news, insider 
trading on negative news adds more to the disclosure of information. In other words, it makes 
47 George J. Stigler, The Optimal Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970); Maria Gutierrez, An Economic Analysis of 
Corporate Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 34 RAND J. ECON. 516 (2003); STEPHEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 518-19 (2004). See also below p. 63.
48
 E.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some 
Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). Compare also Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, 
and the Dog that Did Not Bark, J. CORP. L (forthcoming 2006).
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sense to pay someone for the distribution of information that would otherwise be kept secret 
but not for the distribution of information that would be disclosed fairly quickly in any case. 
Most of the effects of insider trading on negative information differ from the alleged effects of 
a regulation allowing or prohibiting insider trading on both types of information. The 
following sections discuss potential objections to this idea: Proponents of the current 
prohibition may fear the emergence of negative stock bubbles. Insider trading on negative 
information furthers an undervaluation of the stock and leads to undesired negative stock 
bubbles. This concern dates back to the discussion about short sale restraints after the market 
crash in 1929.49 Outside information traders might decline in number or even exit the market 
because of the enhanced presence of insiders. This is undesirable because fewer information 
traders would lead to both less efficiency and less liquidity.50 Closely related to this is the 
concern that the market for corporate control might be undermined because managers would, 
in principle, monitor themselves with discretion whether or not to trade and/or disclose 
information. Managers might have incentives to invest in negative net present value projects 
in order to create insider trading opportunities. Notwithstanding making investment decisions 
with a positive net present value, managers choose highly risky projects. Insider trading on 
negative information might be an inefficient compensation scheme. Insiders might be 
incentivized to delay the transmission of information.
49 Representative Adolph Sabath of Illinois called short selling the “greatest evil” and suggested to ban it. H.R. 4639 Before the 
House Comm'n on the Judiciary, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1932); see also hearings on H.R. 4, H.R. 4604, H.R. 4638.
After the market break of 1937, the SEC adopted the tick test in Rule 10a-1. See Exchange Act Release No. 1,548, 3 Fed. 
Reg. 213 (Jan. 26, 1938); Exchange Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (Dec. 28, 1976) (describing the purposes of 
Rule 10a-1). For a historical overview see Jonathan R. Macey, Mark Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An 
Analysis of the Uptick Rule and its Role in view of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799 (1989).
50
 E.g. Goshen, supra note 9. 
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IV Elements of contemporary stock bubbles
IV.a Stock bubbles and herding behavior
In this section we will look at the effect of our hypothetical on “stock bubbles”, an expression 
often used to describe lasting inaccuracy in stock prices, absent the production of new 
information.51 Roughly stated, if insider trading were permitted, more information would be
incorporated in the price and the price would reflect the fundamental value more accurately.
The economy’s resources would be better allocated which is a gain to social welfare.52 This 
takes into consideration that people would invest their money in the wrong companies, 
investors would consume more (less) in everyday life than they otherwise would have, 
managers would be awarded high salaries even though they worked inefficiently etc.53 Small, 
short-term inaccuracy leads to a small loss to social welfare, while long-lasting stock bubbles 
denote a massive misallocation of the economy’s resources.54
In our hypothetical, insiders are allowed to trade on negative inside information only. The 
hypothesis is that (1) positive stock bubbles (overvaluations) are less likely to arise because 
insiders can trade against them and (2) negative stock bubbles (undervaluations) are not likely 
to arise, with or without insider trading. If it is true that, absent insider trading, there is a 
greater probability of positive bubbles to arise, insider trading on negative information is more 
51 This does not mean that the production of new information is irrelevant for the initiation of bubbles. In fact, it seems that the 
production of new information, e.g. the new technology, and changes in general, are important for the emergence of a bubble 
[compare ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 31-55 (2nd ed 2005)]. However, once a bubble has been initiated 
other factors seem to drive the further development. Consistent with the literature, the term “stock bubble” is used in this 
context to describe a phenomenon where at least some investors buy/sell overpriced/underpriced stock even though they know 
that the stock is overpriced/underpriced. This means that stock bubbles theories usually go beyond mere short-term mispricing
that is due to the fact that new information has been produced, and has yet to be incorporated in the price; compare DeLong et 
al, supra note 60.
52
 Kahan, supra note 43, at 1008 et seq; Clark, Corporate Law (1986) 151.
53
 Many other cases can found. For a broad analysis see Kahan, supra note 38; see also Levmore, supra note 24, 145 et seq.
54 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity (March 2005). Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-26; ECGI -
Finance Working Paper No. 39/2004, http://ssrn.com/abstract=480421; compare also Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. 
Schlingemann & René M. Stulz, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent 
Merger Wave, J. FIN. (forthcoming) http://ssrn.com/abstract=571064; Jap Efendi, Anup Srivastava & Edward P. Swanson, 
WHY DO CORPORATE MANAGERS MISSTATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS? (April 28, 2005). http://ssrn.com/abstract=547922 (with 
an empirical analysis of equity-based compensation in the late 1990’s stock bubble).
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beneficial to social welfare than insider trading on positive information. Before we distinguish
between the two cases, we will look at conventional approaches to stock bubbles.
Stock prices are believed to be a useful proxy for the future cash flows of a firm. Because 
arbitrageurs buy undervalued stock and sell overvalued stock, the price reflects the 
fundamental value. However, arbitrage trading is limited in several ways. 55  Information 
traders are limited in their willingness to trade because they bear the fundamental risk, in 
other words they are not sure about the company’s fortunes. They can offset the fundamental 
risk by hedging their positions but substitutes might not always be available. Fundamental risk 
is a concern to both arbitrageurs with finite and infinite time horizons. Arbitrageurs with finite 
time horizons will place considerable value on when stock prices revert to the intrinsic value. 
If arbitrageurs believe that prices will remain inaccurate for a period exceeding their own time 
horizon, they will abstain from trading on the mispriced stock.56
The common assumption of stock bubble theories is that investors, who know that a certain
stock is overvalued, will not necessarily trade on this arbitrage opportunity by selling the 
stock (short) because the price may further increase. They would have to cover the short sale 
at a high price if the bubble lasts beyond their own time horizons. In fact, depending on an
arbitrageur’s expectations and preferences, he may choose to buy the overvalued stock, so as 
to profit from additional price increases and sell the stock shortly before the bubble bursts. 
The expectation of a further price increase is thus also driven by informed traders who expect 
the bubble to last. However, the main factor seems to be “noise traders” who are not well 
informed about the expected return on the stock. They buy or sell the stock even though no 
new fundamental information has been produced; and thus, they contribute to price 
55
 Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 64, at 17 use four categories: fundamental risk, noise trader risk, institutional limits, and 
cognitive biases by professional traders.
56
 DeLong et al, supra note 60, at 705, 710, 71 3; Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 
(1997); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 64, 18-19.
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distortion.57 As long as noise trader biases are uncorrelated they average out. However, biases 
are often correlated thereby creating “noise trader risk” to arbitrageurs. Everything else equal, 
the probability of a bubble emerging and enduring longer increases where the biases are more 
correlated. As traders have incentives to ride the bubble instead of trading against it, trading 
against the bubble becomes less profitable. This feedback mechanism may cause almost all 
investors to ride the bubble until shortly before they think it will burst. Since there is no well-
defined last period, no one knows when to best sell the stock. Of course, even informed 
traders may lose in the end because they have stayed too long in the market. Stanley 
Druckenmüller, who managed George Soros’ 8.2 billion Quantum Fund until April 2000 
when he resigned due to mounting losses, continued investing in technology stock even 
though he knew it was overvalued. When he was asked why he did not sell, he replied: “We 
thought it was the eighth inning, and it was the ninth.”58
The sentiment that investor beliefs are “biased”, is perhaps best explained by what is termed 
“herding behavior”. Herding behavior theories date back to Keynes59 and make up an integral 
element of stock bubble theories. 60 They can explain why noise trader biases are correlated 
and why, at times, informed traders follow herding patterns. The basic notion can be 
illustrated by a simple story. Suppose that there are two neighboring and equally appealing 
restaurants, A and B. The first customer to arrive arbitrarily chooses restaurant A. The second 
customer arrives to find the first customer in restaurant A.  Relying on the information 
provided by the first customer, the second customer is more likely to choose A than was the 
57
 E.g. ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS 12 et seq, 33 et seq (2000).
58
 New York Times, April 29, 2000, Another technology victim; Top Soros Fund Managers Says He ‘Overplayed’ Hands”.
59 KEYNES, supra note 33, at 157-158 expresses skepticism about “long-term” investors to ensure accurate prices (“… and if in 
the short run he is unsuccessful, …, he will not receive much mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to 
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.”).
60 E.g. J. Bradford DeLong, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann, Noise Trader Risk in Financial 
Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703-738 (1990); Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris, and Andrew Postlewaite, Finite Bubbles With 
Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information, 61 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 206-229 (1993); From a labor 
market point of view see David S. Scharfstein and Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 
(1990).
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first one. In the end all customers may end up in restaurant A even though B might turn out to 
offer better food.61 In a more complex setting, Scharfstein and Stein analyze herding behavior
from a labor market point of view. Their basic assumption is that there are ‘smart’ managers 
who receive substantial information, and ‘dumb’ managers who receive noisy signals. Since 
smart managers observe the same truth, their decisions are correlated, whereas decisions by 
dumb managers are uncorrelated as a result of non-substantial noise. 62  Ceteris paribus, 
managers who mimic the decisions by other managers are perceived more likely to be smart, 
hence more likely to be employed. Managers who do not follow the crowd are more likely to 
be perceived ‘dumb’.63 Those basic approaches to stock bubbles are supported by a number of 
factors, including incentive structures for investors’ agents (e.g. fund managers), sell side 
analysts and short sale restraints. The first factor is used for a better understanding of stock 
bubbles, subsequent issues tell us something about the distinction between over- and 
undervaluations.
IV.b The fund managers’ incentives
Many economic studies try to apply herding behavior theories to the capital market context .64
They often focus on the specific organization of investors (e.g. funds) and legal constraints 
61
 The example is borrowed form SHILLER, supra note 51, at 160. The fact, that the second customer chooses A relies on the 
assumptions that the two restaurants seem equally appealing to each other but no customer knows that this is true for all other 
customers. Otherwise, he would not rely on the first customer having chosen restaurant A.
62
 In a stock market setting, correlation among noise traders is a disputed issue; see Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 64, 11 -17, 
for a short summary of market anomalies (and claims by behavior finance literature). Correlation among noise traders, 
however, is an important assumption for stock bubble theories; see e.g. DeLong et al, supra note 60, at 707.
63
 Scharfstein and Stein recognize that their model does not fit perfectly in a stock market setting but claim that the basic insights 
are relevant; id, at 477.
64
 Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite, supra note 60; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 56; Eitan Goldman & Steve L. Slezak, Delegated 
Portfolio Management and Rational Prolonged Mispricing, 58 J. FIN. 283 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., What caused Enron? A 
Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269-309 (2004); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. 
Palepu, The Fall of Enron, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2003); Ronald J.Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market 
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias (October 2003), Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 240; 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 270; Harvard Law and Economics Disc. Paper No. 446. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=462786; Michael R. Powers, David M. Schizer & Martin Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful 
Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales (March 2003). Yale SOM Working Paper No. ES-22; Columbia 
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(e.g. short-sales). At times, a fund manager may have an incentive to follow the “herd”
instead of trading against it, even though, had she invested her own money, trading against the 
herd would be her optimal strategy. This is roughly accounted for by the difference of time 
horizons that a manger has with regard to his own money and with regard to someone else’s 
money, respectively. 
To maximize on profits, she may invest her personal funds even though she expects the 
bubble to last for relatively long. In turn, if she is someone else’s agent, e.g. a fund manager 
in our case, she will not maximize the return on the (principals’) investments. Rather, she will 
maximize her own benefits which may cause her not to trade against an overvaluation if she 
expects it to last for a period longer than her time horizon as an agent, defined by the 
principals. The investors who entrust their money to the fund manager must carry out periodic 
evaluations of her performance, in order to determine whether to withdraw their money or to 
contribute more capital to the fund. Effectively, this shortens the agent’s time horizon from 
what it would otherwise be.65 The fact that the fund manager himself is an agent of the 
ultimate investor is a fundamental problem related to the inherent information asymmetry in 
any principal-agent relationship.66 Since investors cannot directly observe the fund manager’s
performance, they will look to proxies for performance like the return on their investment.67
This indicator primarily incorporates the short-term effects of the manager’s work. If stock 
prices accurately reflected future cash flows, then current prices would be a reasonable 
indicator for both short-term and long-term effects. However, where stock bubbles emerge, 
prices are, by definition, distorted and fund managers incentives diverge from the incentives 
of the ultimate investors and similarly from socially optimal incentives. 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 217; Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1413. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=391020, at footnote 9 and p. 21 et seq; SHILLER, supra note 61.
65
 Compare, Shleifer, supra note 57, at 90-102.
66
 See below note 38 (for literature) and accompanying text.
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Practically speaking, if a fund manager decides to sell an overvalued stock but the stock price 
continues to rise, he will underperform the benchmark and the capital will flow to other 
funds.68 Even if the stock price eventually falls and the trading strategy was ex ante profitable, 
the fund may have been already dissolved.69 For example, Julian Roberts who managed the 
Tiger Hedge Fund refused to invest in technology stock during the Internet bubble since he 
believed that it was overvalued. The Fund dissolved in 1999 because it could not meet its 
benchmarks.70 Even if funds are not liquidated and capital does not flow to other funds, 
managers would still face limits on long term arbitrage. Because management fees are based 
on indices and comparable funds with relatively short time horizons, the manager is 
incentivized to outperform rival funds.71 If the manager sells an overpriced stock but the price 
continues to rise, he will underperform the benchmark and receive a lower salary. Benchmark 
underperformance plays an important role for the prospects of a fund manager. Empirical 
evidence suggests that, underperformance also plays an important role for ousting a fund 
manager, even though it is not likely to be the sole purpose for dismissal.72 Where the 
manager has no incentives to trade on long-term expectations, mispricing may persist.73
Broadly stated, the fact that many investors hire an agent in order to invest in the stock market 
adds one more agency relationship that limits arbitrage and supports stock bubbles.74
67 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Zweck im Recht, Vol I, 221 et seq (2. ed., 1887), already discussed these issues. Often cited literature 
include ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), Sanford 
Grossmann & Oliver Hart, An Analysis of the Principal Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983).
68
 Healy & Palepu, supra note 64; Coffee, supra note 64. Both try to explain the recent stock bubble.
69 Healy & Palepu, supra note 64, at 19; Coffee, supra note 64, at 299; see also Shleifer, supra note 57, at 89 et seq.
70
 Compare New York Times, April 29, 2000, Another technology victim; Top Soros Fund Managers Says He ‘Overplayed’ 
Hands”.
71
 Coffee, supra note 64, at 299. For a comprehensive analysis see Heber Farnsworth, On the Compensation of Portfolio 
Managers (http://www.olin.wustl.edu/cres/research.cfm).
72
 Heber Farnsworth, supra note 71, at 15 -16.
73 Goldman & Slezak, supra note 64; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 64.
74
 Shleifer, supra note 57, at 89 et seq who develops an arbitrage model where investors are themselves agents of ultimate 
investors.
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IV.c Positive and negative stock bubbles compared
IV.c.i Short sale restraints
So far, our arguments explain why stock bubbles emerge but they do not distinguish between
over- and undervaluations. To understand why positive stock bubbles are more predominant
than negative bubbles, we first look at short sale restraints. Historically, regulators have feared 
speculative trading on undervaluations and the emergence of negative stock bubbles. These 
concerns in particular were articulated in the regulation on short sales (uptick rule75, tax 
disadvantages76 etc). A short sale is a market transaction in which an investor sells borrowed 
securities and is required to return an equal amount of those shares at some point in the future. 
The transaction is beneficial to the investor if the stock price declines. The uptick rule and 
other restrictions on short sales77 find their roots in the 1929 market crash and are often 
justified on emotional grounds.78 Short sales allow for “pessimistic” opinions to enter the 
market. Short sale restraints reflect the common notion that pessimism is undesirable. By 
selling a stock short, investors are able to spread bad reputation of a firm over the market and 
hence causing the firm irreparable damage. Raiders would first sell short and then generate
rumors to profit from falling stock prices.79 Although regulators were primarily worried about 
temporary distortions of single stock, they saw an opportunity for short sellers to cause 
persistent market declines.80
75 The uptick rule states that "No person shall ... effect a short sale ... (A) below the price at which the last sale … was reported; 
or (B) at such price unless such price is above the next proceeding different price at which a sale of such security ... was 
reported ... ."; Rule 10a-1 a) 1 i) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
76 Michael R. Powers, David M. Schizer & Martin Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory 
Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REV. 233 (1994) 249 et seq.
77
 E.g. 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. See also Macey et al, supra note 49,  at 812 and Powers, Schizer, and Shubik, 
supra note 64, at footnote 9 and p. 21 et seq.
78
 Joseph Grundfest, then Commissioner of the SEC said: "When you sell short, you are in a sense betting against the team. At a 
minimum, it is an emotional issue." Vise, Are Short Sales on the Up & UP? NYSE Suspects Violators, But Can't Find Them, 
Washington Post, May 8, 1988, at H1, col. 5. (cited by Macey et at, supra note 49,  at 800); see also Powers, Schizer, Shubik, 
supra note 64, at 20.
79
 Id, at 800 (summarizing some of the emotional arguments).
80
 Id, at 803.
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As it were, virtually all the big one-day stock movements were declines, which suggests that 
large overvaluations are more likely than large undervaluations. 81 Specifically, nine of the ten 
largest one-day stock price movements in the S&P 500 were declines since 1947 and even the 
one increase of 9.1 % on October 21, 1987 followed a 20.5% decline two days before,
suggesting that the market had probably just corrected an overreaction. 82 This data can be 
explained by factors that encourage overvaluations and deter undervaluations, the first of 
which is short selling.
Since investors profit from short selling if the stock price declines, they profit if they sell short 
during an overvaluation, thereby trading against the positive bubble. Economic analysis often 
suggests that it is efficient to allow this trading strategy because short sales eliminate 
inaccurate prices. Likewise, restrictions on short sales –like other restrictions on arbitrage 
opportunities– decrease market efficiency and liquidity. 83 Intuitively sound, some 
commentators have suggested that restrictions on short sales –to the extent to which they are 
effective84– lead to an upward bias in stock prices.85 In a world where short sales are entirely 
forbidden, negative evaluations of investors who are not holding the relevant stock are not (or 
81 Scholars have tried to explain this phenomenon on the basis of a variety of different approaches. See Joseph Chen, Harrison 
Hong and Jeremy C. Stein, Forecasting Crashes: trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices, 61 J. 
FIN. ECON. 345, 346-47 (2001) for a short summary of approaches. It seems that bubble theories have prevailed e.g. SHILLER, 
supra note 61; Shleifer, supra note 57; see supra note 64 for further literature. Alternative theories include leverage effects and 
volatility feedback mechanisms. Theories based on leverage effects argue that a drop in prices increases operating and 
financial leverage and thereby results in a greater volatility of subsequent returns. Enhanced risk further reduces the stock 
price. Similarly, volatility feedback theories are based on the idea that when good news arrives, the direct positive effect is 
offset by an increase in the risk premium that is due to the arrival of new information. In turn, bad information and enhanced 
risk both lower returns, i.e. a higher risk premium boosts the effect of negative information rather than to counterbalance it 
[see e.g. Robert S. Pindyck, Risk, Inflation, and the Stock Market, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 334-351 (1984); Kenneth R. French, G. 
William Schwert & Robert Stambaugh, Expected stock returns and volatility, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 3-29 (1987)]. Moreover, when 
bad news becomes public, the decrease of stock prices is boosted by shareholder suits (see Richard Booth, Who should 
recover what from Securities Fraud?, University of Maryland School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2005 – 32).
82
 Chen, Hong, and Stein , supra note  81, at 346.
83
 Id, at 811; Powers, Schizer, and Shubik, supra note 64, at 5 -9.
84
 It is not clear how effective short-sale restrictions really are. There are both theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence 
against the full effectiveness; e.g. short-selling is allowed to the extent that the investor holds long positions, counting forward 
contract to purchase stock with a specified stock price as a long position, see Powers, Schizer, Shubik, supra note 64, at 16 
and 40-41. See furthermore Raab Schwager, Spanning with Short-Selling Restrictions, 48 J. FIN. 791 (1993) (arguing that 
short sale restrictions do not matter if traders can short an index future).
85
 E.g. Edward Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151- 1168 (1977); Allen, Morris, & Postlewaite, 
supra note 60. For more literature on this issue see Powers, Michael R., Schizer, David M. and Shubik, Martin, supra note 64.
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are less) reflected in the market price than positive opinions.86 To be sure, the fact that all 
optimistic investors influence the market price but only a fraction of pessimistic investors 
have an impact on the price does not automatically lead to overpriced stock because investors 
can learn about this presumed upward bias and discount the prices accordingly. However, 
short sale restraints still make it more likely for a positive bubble to evolve because it restricts 
a trading strategy that eliminates overvaluations. The concept of stock bubbles is plainly 
obvious in this context. As overvaluation is expected to increase, short selling becomes less 
profitable, and vice versa; short selling decreases in profitability as stock bubbles increase in 
duration. That is so because the short seller can only profit if the bubble bursts before she has 
to cover the stock. If she is not able to short the stock for a longer period than the duration of 
the bubble, she will lose. In the most extreme sense, where everyone wants to buy the stock, a 
short seller has no one to buy from in order to cover the short sale.87 Not surprisingly, short 
sale restraints play an important role in many stock bubble theories. They offer one solution to 
the question of why positive stock bubbles are more likely to occur than negative stock 
bubbles.
IV.c.ii Sell- side analysts
With regard to overvaluations, sell-side analysts’ recommendations play or perhaps played an 
important role in overvaluations.88 Sell-side analysts are employed by brokerage firms and 
make recommendations which are passed on to the brokerage firm's customers. Those 
recommendations are intended to help clients make decisions to buy or sell certain stocks. 
Empirical studies have suggested that recommendations of sell-side analysts are not very 
86
 Edward Miller, supra note 85, 1160-1162.
87
 Miller, supra note 85.
88
 E.g. John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2003); SHILLER, supra note 51,  at 44-47.
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accurate forecasts of stock prices. A study by Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman has 
shown that, for the years of 2000 and 2001, the stocks least favored by sell-side analysts 
outperformed the market, and the stocks most highly favored underperformed the market.89
The analysts have especially been described as overly optimistic for their disproportionate
ratio of “buy” and “sell” recommendations. Between 1996 and 2001, 67.1 % of the sell-side 
analysts’ recommendations were strong buy/buy, 29.9% hold, and only 3.0% were sell/strong 
sell.90 Also, analysts were overly optimistic in their earnings forecasts. Analysts’ expectations 
of earnings per share growth exceeded actual growth in nineteen out of twenty-one years 
between 1979 and 1999.91
This inaccuracy of analysts’ opinions was ascribed to an inherent conflict of interest resulting 
from brokerage activities, investment banking fees, analysts’ compensation, equity stakes, and 
pressure from covered firms.92 Generally, information will flow to analysts that are not hostile 
to the respective company, i.e. they prefer issuing ‘buy’ over ‘sell’ recommendations.93
Regulatory actions seem to dissolve this conflict only to a very limited extent.94 The company 
under review always has the option to refuse to talk with an analyst who is expected to submit 
negative forecasts; excluding them from information sessions and denying access to key 
executives.95 Thus, analysts are not expected to suddenly issue highly accurate forecasts. Of 
course, investors can learn about these conflicts and individually downgrade the analysts’ 
recommendations (e.g. strong buy to buy and buy to hold). However, the fact that sell-side 
89 Brad Barber, Reuven Lehavy, Maureen McNichols & Brett Trueman, Reassessing the Returns to Analysts' Stock 
Recommendations, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar./Apr. 2003,  88-96. The results go in the opposite direction for the years of 1996-
1999.
90
 Barber et al, supra note 89, at 90.
91 SHILLER, supra note 51,  at 45-46 with reference to Steven A. Sharpe, Re-examining Stock Valuation and Inflation: The 
Implications of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts, 84 REV. ECON. STAT. 632-648 (2002).
92
 Orcutt, supra note 88, at 13 et seq; Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased 
Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313 (2003) (showing that securities analysts are more likely to be promoted if they offer 
optimistic assessments, particularly of stocks underwritten by their employers).
93
 See e.g. Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305 (2004).
94
 Orcutt, supra note 88.
95 SHILLER, supra note 51,  at 45.
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analysts cover only a very limited number of companies96 and typically tend to drop firms 
before rating them a ‘sell’,97 makes it difficult for investors to adjust their presumed bias.
Moreover, analysts can make corrections to account for adjustments of investors. Due to an 
inherent informational advantage and irrational behavior on side of non-institutional investors, 
analysts are likely to prevail and noise trader beliefs are likely to remain upward biased, thus
supporting positive stock bubbles.98
IV.c.iiiArguments against negative stock bubbles
Virtually all big one-day stock movements were declines, which suggests that large 
overvaluations are more likely than large undervaluations. Legal restrictions on short selling, 
benchmark compensation for fund managers and the role of sell-side analysts may have had 
an impact on those asymmetries. Even without these restrictions, an overvaluation is more 
likely to arise and persist than an undervaluation.99 As explained above, information traders 
might have few incentives to trade against positive stock bubbles. As will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs, increasing undervaluation is subject to mechanisms which eliminate 
inaccurate prices not available for overvaluations, making long-lasting negative stock bubbles
unlikely. As stated earlier, this is important for our hypothetical because insider trading on 
positive information adds less to efficiency, and thus to social welfare, where undervaluation 
96 Maureen McNichols & Patricia C. O'Brien, Self-selection and Analyst Coverage, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 167-199 (Supp. 1997).
97 Frank Fernandez, The Roles and Responsibilities of Securities Analysts, RESEARCH REPORTS VOL II, No. 7, 3-10, at 7 (2001) 
available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol2-7.PDF (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). There are still few “sell” 
recommendations; SHILLER, s supra note 61.
98
 Due to regulatory actions that try to restore investor confidence in analysts (compare Orcutt, supra note 88) and an enhanced 
emphasis on liability (Jill I. Gross, Securities Analysts’ Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Unfair Dealing or Securities Fraud, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 631 (2002)), non-institutional investors will probably continue to rely on analysts.
99
 To be sure, many economic model suggest that  positive stock bubbles are equivalent to negative stock bubbles, i.e. the fear of 
arbitrageurs that the stock will remain overvalued is equivalent to the fear that the stock will remain undervalued; e.g. DeLong
et al, supra note 60, at 705. (“an arbitrageur buying this [underpriced] asset must recognize that in the near future noise traders 
might become even more pessimistic and drive the price down even further.”); see also p. 706 (“our model shows how assets 
subject to noise trader risk can be underpriced”). See also SHILLER, supra note 51,  at 71
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is less probable  even without insider trading. The marginal benefit is low in this case. Insider 
trading is more beneficial to deter overvaluations as they are more likely to happen.
The more the stock is underpriced, the more profitable it becomes to acquire the stock for future 
cash flows. An investor only profits from selling overpriced stock short100 if the stock price 
eventually drops but he can profit from buying underpriced stocks simply because of future cash 
flows. 101 That is, for undervalued stock, a “buy and hold” strategy involves much less “herding 
risk” than does short selling for overvalued stock. An investor who wants to trade against a 
positive stock bubble, can only sell to the extent that he holds shares. Once, he wants to sell 
overpriced stock short, he is not only subject to fundamental risk but also to the fact that the 
bubble may endure (“herding risk”, “noise trader risk”). He profits only if the stock price falls 
before he has to buy the shares on the market in order to cover the short sale.102 If his expected 
time horizon is shorter than the expected duration of the bubble, his expected return will be 
negative. In this case, he will prefer buying to selling overvalued stock, riding the bubble and 
creating an expectation that will lead other investors to support the bubble as well.
As to undervaluations, the buy-and-hold strategy is less risky because one can extract future cash 
flows when holding the stock independent of price changes. This reflects the fact that the 
fundamental value of the stock represents the future cash flows, most importantly expected 
dividend payments and takeover premia. If the stock price is below the expected future cash 
flows discounted to present values, an investor who bought the stock will profit even if the 
negative stock bubble persists, simply by deriving the dividend payments. Of course, if 
dividends are not paid according to the firm’s value and the investor’s time horizon is relatively 
100
 To be sure, the equivalent of buying would be selling. However, selling is limited to the amount of shares one has, so that the 
general mechanism for trading on overvalued stock becomes short selling.
101
 Olivier J. Blanchard, and Mark W. Watson, Bubbles, Rational Expectations and Financial Markets (July 1982). NBER 
Working Paper No. W0945. http://ssrn.com/abstract=226909. (published in Wachtel, ed., Crises in the economic and financial 
structure (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1982).  295-315). For Blanchard and Watson, this is enough to conclude that negative 
bubbles cannot exist.
102
 See p. 21 et seq. To some extent he will be able to expand the initial time horizon.
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short, the difference between undervaluations and overvaluations may not be large. That is, if an 
investor wants to liquidate the assets before the bubble bursts, e.g. because he has to repay the 
loan that he took out to finance the investment, he will lose. To the extent that the bubble is 
expected to outlast his own expected time horizon he will not trade against the negative bubble 
but rather short the stock. Still, because investors derive some cash flows, trading against 
undervaluations requires a time horizon that is somewhat shorter that the time horizon required 
to trade against overvaluations. Moreover, with undervaluations, the firm can eventually be taken 
over, the management removed, and hoarded assets extracted. The expected return from a 
takeover increases as the bubble persists because the price must always decrease in order for 
investors to be able to profit from the bubble.103 This increasing difference between fundamental 
value and price enhances the expected return for a potential buyer of the stock. At some point, 
the concern for risk diversification will be offset by a disproportionally large difference between 
price and fundamental value.104 In expectation of a potential takeover,105 and given the fact that a 
greater part of investors have incentives to trade against undervaluations than against 
overvaluations, investors are less likely to support the bubble by shorting undervalued stock, 
thereby creating a feedback mechanism that affects other investors’ expectations and so on. This 
is supported by the fact that managers have strong incentives as well as the means to disclose 
positive information106, while keeping negative information secret.107 In anticipation of these 
mechanisms investors will choose to ride positive rather than negative bubbles.
103
 This will be explained in the following paragraphs.
104
 Undervaluation is more likely in countries where firms typically have a majority shareholder and where there is no legal 
actions demanding the payment of dividends.
105
 For evidence that the takeover market has remained active despite the use of poison pills see John C. Coates IV, Takeover 
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000).
106
 One way for the management to convince the market of the firm’s undervaluation is simply to buy the stock; Ross, supra note 
22, at 185-186.
107
 See above p. 10.
Kristoffel Grechenig Insider Trading (final draft)  March 2006
- 28 -
The low probability of long-lasting undervaluations is supported by the fact that negative stock 
bubbles have a natural limit, which is reached when the stock price hits zero.108 Conversely,
overpricing is unlimited. That is important because positive and negative stock bubbles require a 
reasonable expectation of an increase in mispricing without a well-defined last period.109 The 
fact that there are infinite time periods on the upside (there is no maximum price) leaves 
everyone uncertain as to if and when the bubble will collapse. With undervaluations, the 
minimum price stands for a last time period. Generally, for an investor who wants to trade with 
the bubble, the “arbitrage profit” must be high enough to offset the difference between price and 
intrinsic value. For positive bubbles: the more a stock is overvalued, the lower are future cash 
flows from that stock (relative to the purchase price); hence, the higher the arbitrage profit must
be.  In contrast, for negative bubbles: the more the stock is undervalued, the greater the loss if the 
stock price bounces back to its intrinsic value because the short seller will have to buy the 
expensive stock that he had sold at a low price in the first place. Thus, an investor will, on 
average, only continue to sell short (buy) if he expects the price to fall (rise) by a greater amount 
than before. With negative bubbles, the expected return E(R)t is the return from an increase in 
mispricing, i.e. a further decline in the stock price pt – pt+1 (where pt – pt+1 > 0) times the 
expected probability t for this to happen, that is the probability that the bubble will not collapse 
and the price will not bounce back up to the stock’s fundamental value at t+1, minus the 
(negative) return, i.e. the difference between the stock price pt and the fundamental value v times 
the probability 1–t that the bubble will collapse.110  The total expected return is the sum of all 
expected returns for t = 1, 2, 3, … n. At t+1 the difference between the price and the 
108
 The stock price cannot drop below 0 because shareholders enjoy limited liability. See also Blanchard and Watson, supra note 
101, at 7-8; Behzad T. Diba and Herschel I. Grossman, The theory of Rational Bubbles in Stock Prices, ECON. J. 98 (1988) 
746-754.
109
 Blanchard and Watson, supra note 101, at 4.
110
 For simplicity, we use a binominal distribution: (1) the price further falls by pt – pt+1 or (2) that the bubble collapses. This is 
also the simplification of Blanchard and Watson, supra note 101, at 4. For a more detailed model see Albert S. Kyle, 
Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315-1336 (1985).
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fundamental value111 v has increased v – pt+1 > v – pt. At the same time, the probability that the 
bubble will collapse has increased 1–t+1 > 1–t because fewer time periods remain before the 
price hits zero. In order for E(R)t+1 to be at least equal to E(R)t, the mispricing must at some 
point increase by more than it did in the previous period.112 This is even more so if we take risk-
aversion into account because the volatility in expected returns increases as t increases. The 
bubble does not converge towards a certain price but would have to exceed every limit.
However, since a negative bubble cannot fall below zero it has a well defined limit, which means 
that investors will exit the bubble one period before this limit is met. But then the bubble will 
burst in the second-to-last period, so everyone will exit in the third-to-last period and so on. 
Thus, negative bubbles are less likely to evolve than positive bubbles,113 which holds true if we 
introduced elements of irrationality (e.g. “noise traders”).114
As this simple model shows, the concern for negative stock bubbles seems much less compelling 
than conventionally thought. Insider trading on negative information does not change this fact 
because investors would trade against them, for the reasons explained. As for positive stock 
bubbles, insider trading (on negative information) would make a change compared to the current 
regime because it would deter overvaluations. This includes not only the elimination of firm 
specific risk but also a decrease in market risk.115 Insiders can trade against positive stock 
bubbles and –other than outside information traders who find it more difficult to confirm that the 
111
 The fundamental value is held constant for simplicity.
112
 Compare the slightly different model by Blanchard and Watson, supra note 101.
113 See Blanchard and Watson, supra note 101, at 5 and Diba and Grossman, supra note 108, at 747, 750 under rational 
expectations. If a (large enough) proportion of investors know how bubbles evolve, they will be able to locate the last period 
(price=0) and –through the mechanism of backward induction- deter the bubble at an early stage. For an explanation of 
backward induction see DOUGLAS BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 159-165 
(1994) and ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 57 (1992).
114
 Compare for example Shleifer, supra note 57, at 33 et seq and 90 et seq who offers two models (one with direct investments 
and one with an additional principal-agent-relationship) that include noise traders and finite time horizons. To be sure, we do 
not argue that negative bubbles are impossible but simply that they are much less likely to develop.
115
 Because insider trading is allowed in all companies it will eliminate some of the market-wide (systematic) risk, namely the 
risks brought about by stock bubbles. Earlier studies seem to focus on the elimination of unsystematic risk; e.g. Kahan, supra 
note 43, at 1027-28 explicitly states that insider trading would only eliminate unsystematic risk.
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stock is overvalued–signal credibly that the stock is overvalued.116 They can do that by first 
selling (or shorting117) the stock of his own company and then, if necessary, officially disclosing 
the negative information.118 This will be anticipated by other traders and thus decrease the 
expected return from trading profits on upward stock bubbles. In the end, upward stock bubbles 
are less likely to arise, thereby limiting insider trading opportunities from the outset. This effect 
can also be considered to be a protective measure for small, uninformed investors because 
typically they are the ones who -due to an inherent informational disadvantage- lose the most 
during stock bubbles.119
V Insider trading debate applied to our hypothetical
V.a Competition in the markets for negative information
An important issue in our hypothetical is that insider trading on negative information will 
decrease the likelihood of overvaluations; consequently, decreasing the probability that 
investors will buy an overpriced stock.120 Insider trading on negative information lowers the 
cost of capital to the firm and serves to detect crises that might otherwise be kept secret. It 
was argued that under a rule that allowed insider trading on both positive and negative 
information, outside information traders would not invest in o btaining (firm-specific) 
116
 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at 868; Kahan, supra note 38, at 1033 -34. For a more general approach to signaling effects 
see A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) and Stephen A. Ross, The Determination of 
Financial Structure, 8 BELL. J. ECON. 23 (1977) in the context of capital markets. Ross also discusses the problem of false 
signals, with a brief reference to insider trading; id, at 30-31. This will be discussed below (p. 47).
117
 Of course, this only works to the extent that short selling is allowed; see above p. 21.
118
 Otherwise, compensation etc would incentivize managers to encourage overvaluations, not to deter them; Kahan, supra note 
38, at 1030. Eli Ofek & Matthew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. FIN. 1113  
(2003) argue that insider selling caused the Internet Stock Bubble of the late 1990’s to burst, which is evidence that insiders 
are able to trade against overvaluations, even if trading is prohibited.
119
 Often “fairness“ arguments are made against insider trading; e.g. Lee, supra note 18, 168 -175 arguing that "Advantages in 
wealth, education or knowledge" are “inherently inegalitarian” and that there is no equal access to inside information. 
Assuming that this is true, uninformed traders may lose much more through stock bubbles. For further literature on the 
morality of insider trading see Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right": The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 LAW & CONT. 
PROBL. 123 (1993); and Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375 
(1999).
120
 Compare also Fischel, supra note 4, at 139 with regard to Dirks v. SEC.
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information because expected information costs would exceed the expected trading benefits . 
Outside traders would decrease in number 121  or even exit the market entirely 122 . The 
informational disadvantage will not only affect information traders but also liquidity traders 
who suffer from a higher bid-ask spread.123 The bid-ask spread has been described as an 
“insider trading tax” that market makers pass on.124 Where outsiders partly exit the market,
liquidity decreases. It has been argued that insiders might have a monopoly on intra-firm 
information and are likely to collude.125 This would lead to less accurate pricing; accordingly, 
markets for information cannot develop.126
For our hypothetical, these arguments are questionable. To the extent that insiders cannot 
predict stock values very accurately, outsiders would not exit the market or re-enter because 
by assumption they can profit by investing.127 Due to their inherent risk aversion, insiders can 
reap only a portion of the total trading profits. Empirical data suggests that most of the profits 
go to information traders.128 Sunk-costs for re-entry of outsiders seem not particularly high.129
In anticipation of potential entrants, insiders themselves are more likely to trade than has been 
suggested under a full prohibition of insider trading. This is supported by the fact that outside 
information traders who want to profit from arbitrage opportunities based on good news will 
not fully disregard potential negative news. They know that a stock increase due to positive 
121 Leland, supra note 15.
122 Goshen, supra note 9. 
123 Leland, supra note 15.
124
 E.g. Manne, supra note 14. There is also literature that questions the relationship between insider trading and the bid-ask 
spread. Compare Bradford Cornell & Erik R. Sirri, The Reaction of Investors and Stock Prices to Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 
1031 (1992) and Omesh Kini & Shehzad Mian, Bid-Ask Spread and Ownership Structure, 18 J. FIN. RES. 401 (1995).
125
 See Goshen, supra note 9, 1241- 1242, 1256 (suggesting that intra-firm competition among insiders might not occur if insider 
trading were allowed and outside information traders have exited the market).
126
 E.g. Goshen, supra note 9, 1240-1242.
127
 Of course, complete informational efficiency cannot be reached, since prices must be sufficiently inaccurate in order for 
traders to have incentives to trade; Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 577.
128 Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1692 (1992) (showing that, on insider 
trading days, only a small fraction of the total trading volume of a firm is due to insider trading). Of course, these studies are 
conducted under a prohibition of insider trading.
129
 In our hypothetical, outside information traders are already investing in the market for positive information; thus, they can re-
enter the market of negative information at a lower cost than has been argued under a regulation where insiders are generally 
allowed to trade (compare Goshen, supra note 9). 
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news might be offset by equally negative news. Hence, they will invest in obtaining negative 
information to ensure that the expected return from trading on the positive information 
detected is not offset by negative information. The idea that outsiders exit the market for firm-
specific information (e.g. financial statements) but continue to invest in general market 
information, reflects the fact that insiders produce firm-specific information at a lower cost. 
Firm-specific information is a by-product of managing or working for the firm as an 
employee. Generally, this does not decrease but increases the accuracy of stock prices.
Secondly, inside information is usually known by more than one insider.130 If insiders want to 
conceal negative information (e.g. an investment has failed), they have to agree not to 
distribute it either, that is to agree neither to disclose it directly nor indirectly through trading 
on it. Since this is a collusive agreement the law will not sanction a deviating behavior, i.e. it 
will not enforce the contract; thus, the conspirators cannot commit to abiding by the contract. 
Either one of the insiders will have an incentive to trade on the negative information for 
trading profits thereby disclosing it. However, insider trading prohibitions allow the 
conspirators to sanction anyone who “cheats”, i.e. trades on negative information, by 
reporting him to the SEC or suing him directly. Insider trading prohibitions provide for 
sanctions that allow enforcement of illegal agreements and thus support collusive fraud. It 
lowers the costs of bribing someone to conform to the agreement.131 Permitting insider trading 
on negative information deprives insiders of sanctions for deviating behavior and thus deters 
the illegal concealment of negative information.132
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that insiders have different compensation schemes 
with different incentives to trade. Employees with less (or no) equity-based compensation 
130
 E.g. Ross, supra note 22, 180.
131
 Compare Gordon, supra note 48, at 1241 -42, arguing with regard to Enron that “independence of virtually every board 
member, including Audit Committee members, was undermined by side payments of one kind or another”.
Kristoffel Grechenig Insider Trading (final draft)  March 2006
- 33 -
might be involved.133 These insiders have more incentives to trade because they will not profit 
from a higher stock price due to non-disclosure of negative information. One way to look at it 
is that -to the extent that employees know negative inside information- they would monitor 
disclosure duties.134 Besides, employees who disagree with a CEO’s decision are less likely to 
confront the CEO directly than by simply trading on this information. To be sure, this 
mechanism may require a mandatory permission for all to trade on non-public bad news
because managers would try to impose restrictions on their subordinates in order to maximize 
their own returns.135
Third, important “outsiders” get to know substantial parts of inside information. Among those 
are gatekeepers like accountants and lawyers. Under the current regime, those gatekeepers do 
not profit from discovering and disclosing negative information because the people that they 
are supposed to monitor are the same as those who hire and fire them.136 We have seen that
sanctions are not sufficient to incentivize proper monitoring in all cases because of inherent 
conflicts of interest.137 If those gatekeepers are allowed to trade on negative information, they 
will have much stronger incentives to act in the interests of investors.138 The likelihood that 
gatekeepers will trade on bad news increases as information becomes more negative because 
(1) civil and criminal liability increases, (2) the expected return from future fees decreases 
(due to potential bankruptcy), and  (3) trading profits increase (due to a greater difference 
between price and fundamental value). Hence, a gatekeeper will be substantially more likely 
132 The same argument cannot be made with regard to positive information because with positive information there is generally
no incentive to keep it secret. As far as positive information is kept secret, e.g. a company finds oil and wants to purchase the 
land at a low price, keeping the information secret is in the interest of shareholders and social welfare; see above Section II.
133
 Compare SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833.
134
 This does not seem undesirable because one would expect employees to be good gatekeepers in this regard. They have both 
the ability to obtain the relevant information and the incentives (if allowed to trade).
135
 Goshen, supra note 9, at 1255.
136
 E.g. Coffee, supra note 64, 290 -291; Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN MGMT. 
REV. 89, 90 (1997); Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Concealment, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 1399, 1436 (2000) (arguing that compensation-related incentives undermine auditor independence).
137
 E.g. Enron, see Healy & Palepu, supra note 64; Coffee, supra note 64. See also the comparison of positive and negative 
incentives (see note 47 and accompanying text).
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to trade on negative information and not approve financial statements than under the current 
situation. With much the same argument, non-employees without specific gatekeeping 
functions have incentives to trade on negative news.139 Unlike managers, they cannot profit 
from non-disclosure.
V.b Does insider trading actually affect stock prices?
An important assumption for enhanced efficiency from insider trading is that insiders will 
actually cause the stock price to move towards its fundamental value. The key element is that 
outside information traders become aware of insider trading so that the price moves towards 
the intrinsic value of the stock. However, scholars have argued that the price effect of insider 
trading is minimal because risk diversification will cause insiders to invest only a fraction in 
the company’s shares and outside traders cannot tell whether price changes were caused by 
insiders or noise traders.140 Consequently, insider trading will not cause the price to reflect the 
intrinsic value of the corporation. 141  This is a concern for trading on both positive and 
negative information.142  Four arguments can be advanced to refute this concern. First, even 
though insiders might not entirely eliminate mispricing, they will cause the price to be a better 
estimate of the intrinsic value than before. Secondly, insiders can sell inside information 
instead of trading themselves.143 Then, risk diversification becomes less of a problem. Third, 
empirical evidence suggest that outside traders do become aware of insider trading. 144
138
 This, again, requires that the right to trade on negative information be mandatory because otherwise firms will require audit 
firms to agree not to trade on such information. 
139
 E.g. Dirks v SEC, 463 U.S. 646. As Raymond L. Dirks later stated: “there is no money” in uncovering “scams”; Wall Street 
Journal, November 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
140
 E.g. Goshen, supra note 9, 1240.
141
 Easterbrook, supra note 1, 335- 337.
142
 To be sure, as long as insiders can sell their stock as a mechanism to eliminate overpricing, risk diversification is less of a 
problem. As soon as insiders start to sell short, risk diversification becomes just as much a problem as for arbitrage profits on 
positive information.
143
 Bainbridge, supra note 1, 43-45.
144
 See Meulbroek, supra note 128 (finding that outsiders detect insider trading and impound the information into the stock price). 
Compare also SHILLER, supra note 51, at 162 for anecdotal evidence of the distribution of inside information.
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Meulbroeck analyzed the trading volume on days where insider trading was detected, using a 
data set that included discovered insider trading cases, supplied by the SEC. After subtracting
shares that have been traded by insiders, the trading volume on insider trading days was still 
significantly higher than on other days. This suggests that outsiders are able to detect insider 
trading. Several strategies are available to outsiders in order for them to find out about insider 
trades using data on trading volume, frequency, direction etc.145
In our hypothetical the question is less controversial. The fact that outsiders may not always 
learn of insider trading is mostly due to the fact that insiders, avoiding legal sanctions, hide 
their trading activity. If trading were allowed, insiders would be more inclined to disclose 
their trading activity. If most or all of the profits can be made legally, the utility of hiding 
insider trading is very low. Consequently, one would expect that outside traders become 
aware of insider trading at a very low cost. This is even more likely to be the case under the 
current regulation, which imposes a duty on insiders to report their trades within two business 
days.146 The result is that the market price will move relatively quickly towards its intrinsic 
value.147 Through these results, we look at the pricing process in our hypothetical situation.
V.c The pricing process in our hypothetical
Conventional wisdom dictates information traders will buy a certain stock if they think that it 
is underpriced and sell a stock if they think it is overpriced. Practically speaking, if an 
information trader estimates the value of a stock at 110 but the market price is 100, he will 
buy. If he thinks the intrinsic value is 90, he will sell. This arbitrage opportunity might be 
created by noise traders who wrongly believe that the intrinsic value is 110 or 90 instead of 
145
 E.g. Meulbroek, supra not 128, at 1691 et seq.
146
 “before the end of the second business day following the day on which the subject transaction has been executed” Sec 16(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act 1934.
147 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 43, at 572-579.
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100 or simply as a result of new information – in more general terms, a difference of 
estimates. Noise trading and herding behavior may effectuate positive stock bubbles.
In our hypothetical, assume that the market price of a stock is 100 in period t, which is also 
the estimate of the information trader.148 First, suppose the stock price rises to 110 at t+1. 
Since insiders are not allowed to trade on positive non-public information, the difference 
between the price (110) and the intrinsic value (100) as observed by the information trader 
cannot be due to positive non-public information of +10. (It is at least not more likely to be so 
than under the current situation where insider trading is not effectively sanctioned.) The 
information trader will sell the stock at t+1 because she thinks that the difference must be 
based on non-substantial public information, thereby eliminating inaccurate prices. The price 
will drop to 100 at t+2. Different from the current regulation where herding behavior may 
cause an upward stock bubble, the outside information trader will not count on the possibility 
that the stock will further rise, leading to an even larger overvaluation. That is so because 
stock bubbles generally require some negative inside information, in the sense that full 
availability of all information would lead to a lower estimate of the expected return than does 
the market price. Under the current regulation, insiders are not allowed to use that information 
and thus cannot trade against the bubble. More precisely, insiders weigh the expected benefits 
from trading against the expected losses, including the legal sanctions; they will wait longer 
before they trade against overvaluations than if insider trading were allowed. In our 
hypothetical, insiders may trade immediately on this inaccuracy by selling the stock and 
eventually selling it short. Unlike outside traders, they have the ability to disclose the relevant 
inside information, e.g. by stating correctly the earnings or revealing information through 
other means. In other words, insiders have better means of credibly signaling that the stock is 
worth less than the market price predicted. This point is of particular importance because 
Kristoffel Grechenig Insider Trading (final draft)  March 2006
- 37 -
typically outside investors do not have the credibility to effectively signal inside information 
to the public; so trading profits from selling are much riskier for them due to a higher 
probability of persistent overvaluations. Insiders generally succeed in convincing the market 
that the prospects are worse than thought as long as they have incentives to do so. This will 
deter the bubble and hence reduce the market price to its intrinsic value because neither noise 
traders nor information traders, anticipating this mechanism, can expect the bubble to 
increase.
Secondly, assume that the market price of 100 in period t declines to 90 at t+1. The 
information trader believes that the intrinsic value is 100 since she has not observed any 
substantial negative information. Where trading on negative information is allowed, insiders 
will disclose their trading activity and information traders will know the cause of the decline. 
If the decline was not due to insider trading, information traders will buy the stock until it 
reaches its initial value of 100. This result is plausible if insiders always disclose their trading 
activity. As noted above, when insider trading is permitted, insiders are inclined to disclose 
their trading activity. However, in some cases, insiders will not disclose the information, e.g. 
an employee who expects intra-firm sanctions. The information trader would not know if the 
decline was the result of insider trading or noise trading. Still, the pricing process works in 
much the same way. If the decline was due to noise trading, then insiders will buy the stock at 
t+1, because they know that the decline had not been caused by insider trading and they know 
that no substantial information became public. Remember, in our hypothetical, insiders are 
still allowed to buy as long as they are not trading on substantial non-public information. 
Insiders will buy and consequently eliminate this inaccuracy; the price will return to its 
intrinsic value of 100.149 Outside information traders will contribute to the accuracy as far as 
148 The following paragraphs try to explain the pricing process verbally and in a strongly simplified way.
149
 The management could also make a repurchase tender offer to signal that the stock is underpriced; e.g. 
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insiders cannot entirely eliminate the price distortion.150 In turn, if the decline (-10) was due to 
negative non-public information on which insiders traded, the price will persist at 90. Insiders 
have no reason to buy the stock. Outside information traders will observe that the stock price 
remains at 90, and accordingly, will adjust their estimate to 90.151 To be sure, insiders as well 
as outsides could start to ride on what they observe to be a negative bubble. However,
negative bubbles are not likely to last very long, undercutting the profitability of such a 
trading strategy.152
VI Potential distortion of incentives
VI.a Do managers have incentives to make bad investment decisions?
Managers have been delegated the right to take a large portion of decisions in our economy. If 
the choices made are the ones that maximize shareholder wealth, they are traditionally
presumed to promote social welfare.153 Of course, corporate managers are not exempt from 
the natural inclination to maximize one’s personal benefits. The right incentive structure can 
limit this fundamental principal-agent problem.154
A prominent way of aligning the interests of mangers and shareholders is performance-based 
compensation. If the company does well, the manager will be awarded a higher remuneration
than if the company does poorly. It has been argued that insider trading would unbundle 
Francis H. Buckley, When the Medium Is the Message: Corporate Buybacks as Signals, 65 IND. L. J. 493 (1990) . The signaling 
effect of this mechanism is, however, ambiguous; See Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading With Repurchase 
Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421 (2000).
150
 Compare Bainbridge, supra note 1, 45; Gilson and Kraakman, supra note 64, 572- 579.
151
 See fn 149; see also Ross, supra note 22, 181. Ross, however, points out that the signaling effect is ambiguous because 
insiders might be selling stock for a variety of reasons (e.g. to pay a children’s education).
152
 See above p. 25.
153 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 678 
(12th ed. 1985).
154 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972); Steven A. Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers & Proc.) 134 
(1973); Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); 
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performance-based incentives because managers could profit from stock price declines.155 To 
be sure, insiders benefit on the upside from trading profits and compensation, etc, while 
profits on the downside are partly offset by a lower compensation. Whether the managers 
decide to create trading opportunities on the upside or on the downside depends on the costs 
associated with the creation of trading opportunities. Since it is harder to create positive than 
negative news, insider trading could discourage managerial effort.156 This issue results from 
the double incentive effects on both disclosure and investment decisions with an emphasis on 
the latter.
In our hypothetical, the issue of unbundling compensation schemes seems to be a serious 
concern, at first sight, because managers can make additional profits from stock declines only. 
The fact that insiders are allowed to trade on negative information might create incentives for 
the management to take bad rather than good investment decisions. Bad decisions will lead to 
productive inefficiency, which will cause a decline in stock prices and so create trading 
opportunities. However, these trading opportunities stand against important potential losses.
First, performance-based compensation will decrease, the more trading opportunities are 
being created. This negative correlation between performance-based compensation and insider 
trading profits reduces the incentives to make bad investment decisions. Trading profits (on
the downside) –as opposed to performance-based compensation (on the upside)– will have to 
be shared with other insiders if more than one person knows the information. This effect 
further reduces the profits, at constant losses from a lower compensation. That is, an insider 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
155 James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School", DUKE L. J. 628 (1986); Jesse 
M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Trough Predating Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303 
(1998) 306-307, 314 -315. Compare also Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 873; Levmore, supra note 24, at 149.
156
 See e.g. Levmore, supra note 24, at 149 (“temptation of profit might actually encourage an insider to act against the 
corporation's interest”); Fried, supra note 155, 306-307 (“discourage managerial effort”); see also Gilson and Kraakman, supra 
note 64, at 632 n. 221 (suggesting that an increase in risk might not be matched with a commensurate increase in return).
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who gives up stock options for trading profits transforms an exclusive remuneration to a non-
exclusive form, contrary to the insider’s interests.
Secondly and closely related, the manager’s ability to pursue bad opportunities is constrained 
because other managers and employees will attempt to maximize the firm value.157 Of course, 
all insiders could collusively agree not to maximize the firm value but collusion is 
complicated where a larger number of people are involved. As noted above, collusion is less 
likely if insider trading is permitted because deviating behavior (i.e. one of the insiders breaks 
the agreement and sells) can be sanctioned by reporting the person to the SEC if trading is 
prohibited. 
Third, bad management decisions will increase the probability of hostile takeovers, and 
subsequently, the probability for the insider of being ousted. Insofar as product markets are 
efficient, bad management decisions will bring about bankruptcy. Because other firms can 
produce their goods at a lower cost and thus offer them at a lower price to the consumers, they 
will drive inefficiently operating firms out of the market. In a fully competitive market, firms 
that allow such trading profits from arbitrarily created negative information will not stay in 
the market long.158 Even in less than fully efficient markets negative investments will, at some 
point, make it impossible for firms to offer their goods at a price that equals their costs.
Fourth, the fact that a manager has made a bad investment decision will damage his 
reputation,159 decrease his value on the job market and lead to various social sanctions.160 As 
socio-economic analyses show, people prefer receiving social approval, such as being 
admired by others, and dislike social disapproval, such as others’ disgust and contempt.161
157
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 874, distinguishing between “good” and “poor” opportunities.
158 Oliver D. Hart, The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme, 14 BELL J. ECON. 366 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 557 (1985).
159
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 874-875.
160 MANNE, supra note 1, at 155 arguing that managers who perform poorly in order to create trading opportunities will soon be 
unemployed.
161
 Fehr & Falk, supra note 40, at 704 et seq.
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Thus, consistent with our intuition, a manager may not only face monetary but also non-
monetary sanctions.
Fifth, the fact that insider trading is permitted does not mean that the law allows managers to 
take investment decisions with a negative expected return. A manager who makes a bad 
investment breaches his fiduciary duties. The business judgment rule will not protect the 
manager if he is in a conflict of interest due to insider trading.162 Even though the insider 
might claim that the bad investment decision was taken independently of subsequent trading 
activity in order to be protected by the business judgment rule, his strategy seems quiet 
hazardous. 163 He would be voluntarily rendering himself subject to a legal action for 
fraudulent behavior, having profited from an investment decision that turned into a loss and 
potentially not being protected by the business judgment rule. Even though courts may not be 
well suited to “second guess” business decisions,164 they are generally able to identify and 
punish self-interested transactions. 165 Due to endogenous and exogenous factors, an 
investment decision would have to be clearly harmful in order to reduce the risk associated 
with the trading. For low-risk trading profits, the insider’s investment decision requires a 
negative expected return with a high number of the significantly negative expected outcomes. 
162
 Clark, supra note 52, 123 et seq. It shall be noted that the business judgment rule was never fully accepted; Leo Herzel & Leo 
Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187, 1190 (1986); Franklin A. 
Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 289 (1994); 
Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 
1478 (1984); Fred S. McChesney, A Bird in the Hand and Liability in the Bush, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002); Daniel 
Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of 
the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. 
REV. 591 (1983).
163
 The courts can lower the alleged negative incentive effect by punishing insider trading more severely that was conducted by 
insiders responsible for the disadvantageous investment decision. In this case, negative information will primarily be 
distributed by other insiders that learn of the facts without being responsible for the decision.
164
 E.g. Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economics and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. van Gorkom and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 675 (2002). It shall be noted that the business judgment rule was not only attacked on 
policy grounds but, in fact lost influence in various circumstances: e.g. in the context of takeovers see Mark J. Loewenstein, 
Toward an Auction Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 
(1989); moreover, the waste doctrine -even though its practical use is contested [compare William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, 
and Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 859 (2001)]-, is a substantive standard of review that applies even if the requirements of the business judgment 
rule have been met [e.g. Victor Brudney, Revisiting the Import of Shareholder Consent for Corporate Fiduciary Loyalty 
Obligations, 25 J. CORP. L. 209, 225  (2000)]. 
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This is even more so for typical insiders like managers and employees because they are more 
risk averse than diversified shareholders.166 In this case, it is more likely that the insider will 
be held liable. In contrast, if the expected outcomes are broadly distributed with many
outcomes far from the mean (both above and below), liability is less likely but the risk 
increases. The tradeoff between risk and potential liability will either cause the insider trading 
opportunities to be highly risky or increase the insiders’ probability of liability. Both are
undesired from the point of view of an insider. All together, insiders have few incentives to 
make bad investment decisions for the purpose of creating trading opportunities.167
VI.b Do managers have incentives to invest in high-risk projects?
It has been argued that insider trading will increase the level of risk of the firm. Instead of 
making investment decisions with negative expected returns, managers will simply decide to 
invest in high risky projects. This way they create trading opportunities which they can 
exploit.168 However, it is uncertain whether this has a harmful effect. Management’s intrinsic 
risk- aversion indicates that they are generally more risk averse than shareholders would 
prefer.169 In fact, insider trading may counterbalance the management’s incentives to invest in 
low risk projects; an effect that is in the best interest of shareholders.170 Of course, we neither 
know to what degree insider trading incentivizes risk-taking behavior nor do we know the 
extent of the difference in risk-aversion between managers and shareholders.171 However, we 
can compare the alleged effects of a complete deregulation with the potential effects in our 
165 See Clark, supra note 52, 126 -128 arguing that courts often hold directors liable without requiring the plaintiffs to prove all 
elements of self-dealing.
166
 See below Section VI.b.
167
 Moreover, it shall be noted that this whole critique of insider trading applies only to those that make investment decisions in 
the company (e.g. executive managers) and not to other insiders.
168
 Easterbrook, 332; Bainbridge, supra note 1, 51-53.
169
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 875. Carlton and Fischel suggest that the need for incentives to increase volatility may be 
one explanation for the existence of stock options.
170
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 875-876.
171
 See also Bainbridge, supra note 1, 63.
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hypothetical. Where insider trading on positive and negative information is allowed, trading 
benefits increase as volatility increases. In our hypothetical, the managers’ incentives to invest 
in high risk projects are lower than under a general permission of insider trading, since 
managers can gain no additional payoff on the upside. Every trading benefit is offset by a 
decrease in other future benefits (e.g. performance based compensation). To align the levels of 
risk between shareholders and managers, profits from negative information seem more 
important than profits from positive information. That is, insider trading on the downside acts 
as an insurance of the managers allowing them to hedge the risks associated with risky 
investments.
VI.c Insider trading and excessive pay?
Insider trading profits are part of managerial compensation.172 Accordingly, managers who 
are allowed to trade on inside information would receive less other pay. Overall, the 
manager’s remuneration, whether partially through insider trading or not would be roughly 
equivalent. Critics have contested this view by arguing that insider trading is an in efficient 
compensation scheme. Managers are typically risk -averse and thus prefer a less volatile 
compensation package than one that involves profits from insider trading.173 This is generally 
true with respect to risky pay. Because managers are risk averse, they discount equity-based 
compensation in comparison with fixed pay.174 Of course, this cost has to be weighed against 
the benefits of a more efficient incentive structure. Even though it is hard to measure these 
factors, there seems to be a consensus that well designed incentives provided for in the 
172 MANNE, supra note 1, chs. 8-10; Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1. 
173
 Easterbrook, supra note 1, 332.
174
 Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in designing Equity-based pay, 15 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. (2003). Since managers can not diversify 
risk as well as investors, they value restricted stock at 80%-90% of its cash value and option grants at 50%-75%; see also 
Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Price for Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 209-214 (2002). 
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compensation scheme are overall beneficial. 175 Moreover, as noted, insider trading on 
negative information would undo some of the risk associated with performance-based 
compensation. Because insiders can profit on the downside only, risk may be lower than 
under both alternative regimes, given that equity-based compensation is used.
Still, incentives through compensation are considered to have performed substantially worse 
than expected. The fundamental problem of performance evaluation is that performance 
cannot be directly observed; rather it has to be inferred from other factors. This is important 
not only for setting compensation incentives but also for other decisions, like hiring or
removing a manager, buying or selling the stock etc. Traditionally, the stock price is 
considered to be the best estimate of performance because it incorporates a great number of 
investors’ opinions. This approach is believed to mitigate the divergence of long-term and 
short-term performance. Because investors consider future cash flows, a manager cannot 
transfer future wealth to current wealth. However, long-term prospects are widely uncertain, 
especially to investors, so that short-term payoffs dominate the price. Because investors have 
to make their decisions now without knowing the long-term effects, managerial performance 
is evaluated for a relatively short time horizon.
It has been argued, with regard to stock options, that managers can influence their own 
compensation arrangement in a way they were not able to do with regular remuneration. 
Because managers are in control of the board and mutually decide about each others 
compensation, they are likely to grant a larger compensation than would be efficient. This is 
especially so if the specific pay is camouflaged through stock options and other performance-
based compensation.176 Once a deal has been made they can “renegotiate” it through boosting 
175
 E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 797 (2002), who criticize the compensation plans used in the past, 
acknowledge that the share price provides a useful tool for evaluating executive performance if the pay plans are well 
designed. 
176
 Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 175, at 789.
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the stock price above fundamentals and beyond that which was anticipated.177 Consequently, 
compensation itself may be part of the agency problem.178 The quasi-paradox to equity-based 
compensation is: if managers are given incentives to maximize the firm’s value, measured by 
the stock price, managers have incentives to distort the stock price; however, with inaccurate 
stock prices equity-based compensation does not set efficient incentives. Incentives through 
equity-based compensation may themselves distort incentives. Of course, once equity-based 
compensation is abandoned, the mentioned incentives serving to distort the price disappear.
Simultaneously, incentives for increasing the firm’s value are lost. This story suggests that 
managers can increase their compensation against the will of the (current) shareholders.
This approach has been contested by showing that compensation based on the stock price does 
not run counter to the shareholders’ interests. More precisely, stock options are not 
incompatible with the interests of those shareholders that held stock at the time the manager 
was hired, or granted performance based compensation, respectively. I will call them “first 
period” shareholders. Suppose that shareholders buy the stock at a price that equals the 
fundamental value at t=0. At t=1, they hire a manager and agree to pay compensation
contingent on the stock price; in other words, the manager receives more compensation if the 
price increases. If the manager is able to boost the stock price above the fundamental value, 
that is initiate a stock bubble, both first-period shareholders and the manager are better off at 
t=2 than they would be otherwise. 179 These gains are derived from “second-period” 
shareholders who bought at an inflated price. From this perspective, compensation based on 
177
 This seems especially plausible in the context of information asymmetries with less than fully rational investors. See Efendi, 
Srivastava & Swanson, supra note 54 for an empirical analysis of compensation through options and accounting restatements 
(as an indicator for financial misstatements). They find that managers are more likely to misstate the financial situation of the 
firm when they hold a lot of in-the-money options.
178 Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERS. 71 (2003). Compare 
also Gordon, supra note 48, at 1247 (“managers with a rich load of options have incentives to get the stock price high by any 
means necessary, fraud included”) and Manne, supra note 48.
179
 Compare Patrick Bolton, Jose A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in 
Speculative Markets, ECGI Finance Working Paper N°.79/2005 (arguing that incentivizing managers to boost the stock price 
and paying what has been labeled “excessive compensation” is not irrational in the context of stock bubbles).
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the stock price seems totally rational, 180 even though managers make large profits and 
misallocations resulted in a loss to social welfare. In short, wealth was redistributed to first 
period shareholders without productive gains.
Insider trading on negative information can mitigate the alleged inefficiencies. Because 
trading on negative information will deter overvaluations, managers are less likely to either 
retroactively increase their pay to the detriment of shareholders or benefit from overvaluations 
to the detriment of “second-period” shareholders. More generally, insider trading on negative 
information enhances the predictability of executive pay due to more accurate stock prices;
consequently, making performance based compensation a better tool for setting efficient 
incentives. If stock prices are less distorted, prices capture performance to a larger extent, 
filtering out other factors that are not performance-related. Regardless of whether it was in the 
interests of some shareholders or not, (socially) excessive pay, as was experienced in recent 
years, would be precluded. 181  This is a gain to social welfare because incentives from 
performance-based compensation would be closer to socially optimal incentives.182
Because social gains from insider trading must always be weighed against alternative methods 
of aligning private and social incentives, it is important to note that there are few ways to 
otherwise mitigate the problem. Generally, managers will always have incentives to overstate 
the value of the firm, if he is compensated on the basis of his performance. This includes 
stock option plans that try to reduce windfall gains by indexing. 183  If compensation is 
contingent on benchmarks, like a sector index, only exogenous factors are filtered out. That is, 
if every firm did better without hard work, a manager would receive no additional pay. Still he 
180
 That is rational for first-period shareholders, given that some other market participants act irrationally or that for some other 
reason stock bubbles may emerge.
181 Manne, supra note 48. See also Bolton, Scheinkman & Xiong, supra note 179, who do not discuss the issue of insider trading, 
however. It shall also be noted that, in their model, pay was not excessive in that it was irrationally granted. However, they 
suggest that the compensation exceeded socially optimal compensation. 
182 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 10, 867.
183
 See Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 175, at 796, for a short summary of possible option structures.
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would not be barred from overstating his own performance. In fact, indexing might even 
increase incentives for managers to distort prices for additional benefits.184
One may argue that this in fact mitigates the problem associated with performance-based 
compensation but that insider trading itself creates new opportunities for camouflaging their 
compensation. As noted above,185 insiders are constrained, by both law and economic forces, 
from creating negative information arbitrarily or riding a negative stock bubble. Thus, they 
are unable to unilaterally undo their compensation arrangement. If at all, this concern may 
apply to insider trading on positive information. But trading on positive information is not 
allowed in our hypothetical.
VI.d Do managers have incentives to interfere with corporate plans?
It has been argued that insiders might interfere with corporate plans, for example, with a 
potential takeover. Because insiders know about the takeover bid first, they will buy shares 
and cause the price to rise. This will make the takeover more expensive and lower the gains to 
the shareholders.186 Potential takeover firms will be reluctant to discover undervalued firms 
because they cannot exploit such opportunities. This will harm the target corporation because 
it deters potential takeover firms from buying the stock and ousting an inefficient 
management. It might also deter potential takeover firms from achieving productive 
efficiencies through the integration of the two firms. The rationale is questionable because 
even if insiders are allowed to trade, they are not allowed to harm the corporation.187 That is, 
184
 Compare Kevin J. Murphy, Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Executive Compensation & 
Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 863-64 (2002) (showing that with indexing induces additional risk on managers). Because 
managers are less likely to earn from good performance, simply because others may work hard as well, the managers may 
have even stronger incentives to boost the prices above fundamentals.
185
 See above VI.a.
186
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 884; see also Bainbridge, supra note 1, 51; Easterbrook, supra note 1, 331.
187
 Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, 884.
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they are still prohibited from misappropriating the corporation’s business opportunities. 188 In 
any case, this concern is limited to positive information.189 In our hypothetical, there are no 
negative consequences because insiders are not allowed to trade on positive information; 
consequently they cannot legally exploit such opportunities.
Insiders might distort the business operations only temporarily to cause trading 
opportunities.190 For example, a manager announces a potential business opportunity, e.g. 
negotiations with another company, which the market believes to be beneficial, and thus 
causes the price to rise. She then sells the stock short and reports that the negotiations have 
failed. This is certainly a loss to social welfare because at best redistribution came at a certain 
cost but without any gains. Whether or not the corporation is harmed, liability will deter the 
manager from such conduct. She will most likely not be protected by the business judgment 
rule because the trading profits imply self-interest. As noted above, low risk trading 
opportunities require large distortions, thus enhance expected liability and vice versa. 191
Moreover, section 16(b) already deters such a behavior by explicitly prohibiting short swing 
profits.192 Other mechanisms also deter such conduct. For example, a manager, who devotes 
his time to creating distortions, will earn less on performance-based compensation.193
188 This is economically efficient; see Landes, supra note 35,  and below p. 55. See also Bainbridge, supra note 1, 51.
189
 Compare Easterbrook, 331: “the rationale for restrictions on insider trading … applies only when secrecy is necessary to 
preserve the value of the information to the firm that created the knowledge.” As to takeovers and other corporate 
opportunities, the knowledge created is positive information, which insiders are not allowed to trade on in our hypothetical.
190
 E.g. Goshen, supra note 9, 1258-1259.
191
 I refer to note 162 and accompanying text where I have discussed the deterrence effects of liability.
192 Whether and how section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 should be modified according to our analysis goes 
beyond the scope of this paper. For the current purpose, it suffices to mention that short-term distortions, as discussed in the 
text, can be effectively detered.
193
 See above Section VI.a for other deterrents, some of which (e.g. social recognition) apply to the present context.
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VI.e Delay in transmission of negative inside information?
Some have argued that allowing insider trading may cause insiders to delay the transmission of 
information in order to have sufficient time to trade.194 This was seen to be crucial when the 
information has to pass through many levels before reaching the decision maker. A small delay
on each level, it has been asserted, will amount to a substantial total delay.195 The argument 
seems stronger with regard to positive information because the choice is generally between 
immediate disclosure and delayed disclosure. It might well be that insider trading causes a delay 
in the disclosure of positive information. This is not a problem in our hypothetical since trading 
on positive information is not allowed. 
As to negative information, non-disclosure is an important third option.196 As discussed above, 
there are strong incentives for not disclosing negative information at all.197 Likewise, there are 
strong incentives for deferring the disclosure of information as much as possible. Because 
information is delayed in any case, insider trading on negative information adds nothing or very 
little to the delay. In other words, the marginal incentive of insider trading for the delay of 
negative information is close to zero. Likewise, the marginal loss to efficiency is close to zero. 
More importantly, insiders cause information to be distributed that would, absent insider trading, 
remain secret. Where insiders are allowed to trade, they may slightly -if at all- delay the 
distribution of information but will not withhold the information. Thus, the “delay in disclosure” 
argument is much less compelling for inside trading on negative information than it seems to be 
for insider trading on positive information.
194 Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, MICH. L. REV. 1051, 
1053-60 (1982); Bainbridge, supra note 1, 50.
195
 Id.
196
 This intuition is also reflected in Dirks v SEC, 463 U.S. 646, footnote 18; see below p. 57. Compare also Kenneth Sco tt, 
Insider Trading: 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 810-11 (1980) .
197
 See above Section II.b.
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VII Insider selling in excess of insider purchasing
Empirical studies show that insiders trade on non-public information before the information 
gets released.198 Such studies are often carried out for the purpose of examining the various 
forms of market efficiency. Generally, they show that insiders consistently outperform the 
market, suggesting that the market does not incorporate inside information (semi-strong form 
of market efficiency). For our purpose, those studies are important because they indicate
differences between selling and buying activity by insiders. Our hypothetical suggests, and 
this is supported by empirical evidence, that insiders are more likely to trade on negative non-
public information than they are on positive information . A study by Seyhun shows that 
insider trading includes almost twice as many sales as purchases in large corporations.199
These two largest quintiles represent 70% of all transactions and 85% of the dollar value of all 
transaction in the data set.200 The overall ratio of purchases to sales is 0.7.201 Similarly, a
study by Rozeff and Zaman shows that -in the largest quintile- sales outnumber purchases by 
almost four times.202 Lakonishok and Lee report roughly twice as many sales as purchases
overall for the period between 1975 and 1995.203 It has been argued that these findings 
support the claim that insider trading creates incentives for bad management decisions.204
198
 H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189 (1986) and Michael S. 
Rozeff and Mir A. Zaman, Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence, 61 J. BUS. 25 (1988). See also Fried, supra 
note 155, at 317-324.
199
 Seyhun, supra note 198, 193- 194 (the ratio of purchases to sales is 0.57 for firms with an equity between 250 million USD and 
1 billion USD, and 0.59 for firms with an equity of above 1 billion USD).
200
 Seyhun, supra note 198, at 193. The total sample was grouped by the average size of equity of the firms: less than $25 million, 
between $25 and $50 million, between $50 and $250 million, between $250 million and $1 billion, more than $1 billion.
201 Id.
202
 Rozeff and Zaman, supra note 198, 41-42. (21.5% purchases and 78.5% sales). The excess selling activity is not the result of 
grants of restricted stock, etc because Rozeff and Zaman isolated trades that are likely to be due to non-public information 
(they have filtered out liquidity sales, etc, by introducing an “intensive trading” criterion and by requiring a certain minimum 
number of insider trades); id, at 28.
203 Josef Lakonishok & Inmoo Lee, Are insider trades informative?, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 79, 85-86 (2001). They report a higher 
ratio for large companies, consistent with other studies. Compare also Jana P. Fidrmuc, Marc Goergen & Luc D. R. 
Renneboog, Insider Trading, News Releases and Ownership Concentration, J. Fin. (forthcoming)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796033.
204
 Fried, supra note 155, at 314. Fried cites a study by Robert T. Masson & Ananth Madhavan [Insider Trading and the Value of 
the Firm, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 333 (1991)] which, however, yields ambiguous results with regard to the effects on firm value. 
As the authors themselves acknowledge that “Imposing a uniform standard may induce inefficiency, and it may be argued that
the policing of insider trading is best left to the firm in question.” Moreover, empirical results are strongest for executives near 
retirement (p. 348, Table I).
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Because insider can more easily create negative information than positive information, they 
are more likely to profit by selling. As indicated above, there are strong arguments supporting 
the view that insiders would not make bad decisions intentionally.205 The evidence might be 
better explained by the efficiencies of insider selling compared to insider buying, as suggested 
by our hypothetical. Outside information traders are more likely to tolerate trading on 
negative information than trading on positive information because bad news would otherwise 
remain secret for a relatively long period of time.206 This inaccuracy is a loss not only to 
social welfare but also to private utility of outside traders because traders discount the price 
due to a potential overvaluation. The fact that outsiders have higher costs for discovering 
inside information than insiders applies to positive and negative information. However, as 
explained above, outsiders have to pay less for the distribution of positive information 
because disclosure is sufficiently incentivized.
Generally, corporations do not impose formal restrictions on insiders.207 However, the threat 
of investors to sell their stock could encourage insiders to comply with a more efficient extra-
legal regulation,208 in our case a regulation that allows insider trading on negative information 
but not an positive information. This is consistent with studies on insider trading sanctions. 
Market professionals seem to alert the SEC more to insider buying than selling. Even though 
there is no direct evidence, empirical studies show that (1) the SEC brings most of the cases 
for purchasing activity209  and (2) referrals from market professionals are the predominant
205
 See above p. 38.
206
 This is consistent with the finding that in smaller firms there is more purchasing activity (Seyhun, supra note 198, 193) 
because in smaller firms outside investors are more likely to “share insider trading profits” than to force the management into 
the most efficient system.
207
 E.g. Bainbridge, supra note 1, 62; Dooley, supra note 14, at 45 -46; Carlton and Fischel, supra note 1, at 858.
208
 Compare, however, the doubts by Bainbridge, supra note 1, 209 and Haft, supra note 194, 1058.
209
 See Meulbroek, supra note 128, 1670. The sample consists of individuals charged with insider trading by the SEC in civil of 
administrative cases during 1980-1989. The data regarding excess insider selling refers to 1975-1981 (Seyhun, p. 192) and 
1973-1982 (Rozeff and Zaman, p. 27) and is not constructed upon SEC charges.
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source of SEC investigations210. In a sample taken from the period between 1980 and 1989, 
87% of the charges were brought for trading on positive news, whereas only 13% of the 
charges applied to trading on negative information.211 This is interesting because, with more 
insider sales than purchases, one would expect enforcement actions to represent a similar 
ratio. In fact, the correlation is highly inversed.
Efficiencies, as explained in our hypothetical, can explain this divergence. Outside 
information traders may have understood that insider trading on negative news is more 
beneficial than trading on positive news. Thus, outsiders alert the SEC more often to trading 
events with regard to positive information. Because negative news is hard to uncover, 
outsiders may, depending on the circumstances, prefer that insiders trade on that information, 
thereby disclosing it as opposed to not knowing the information at all. Private benefits seem to 
converge with social benefits.212 Only in times of potential overvaluations, informed outside 
traders will have incentives to restrict insider selling beyond socially optimal restrictions, in 
order to extract wealth from other typically, less informed investors.213 This can also explain, 
why enforcement actions regard not only positive information but also negative information. 
Another explanation might be that there are sets of facts where both insider buying and selling 
are inefficient and sets of facts where only insider buying is inefficient, depending on the 
210
 See e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189 (1995), 1263-1264 (stating that informants played a key role in most of the big cases in the 
1980’s. See also the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988 (ITSFEA) which authorized the SEC to pay to the 
whistleblowers of up to 10 percent of any penalty collected by the SEC. See Meulbroek, supra note 128, at 1682 who 
indicates that only 9 % of the investigations are conducted without external complaints and referrals. Also Laderman, The 
Epidemic of Insider Trading, Bus. Wk., April 29, 1985, at 80 [cited in David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation 
on Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J. LAW & ECON, 311, 333 
(1987)] note that market professionals are the major source of SEC investigations.
211
 Meulbroek, supra note 128, 1165-1670. Cases settled before trial as well as a number of other case were excluded. However, 
those cases are likely to be uncorrelated with purchasing or selling activity.
212
 Ex post, outsiders may choose to sue even though, ex ante, they were better off committing not to sue. In anticipation of this 
threat, insiders could choose not to trade, thereby keeping negative information secret. Socially optimal incentives would 
diverge from private incentives. A thorough analysis (including free rider problems) would go beyond the scope of this paper 
and is not essential to our main point. However, it shall be noted, that not suing can be optimal because one builds a reputation 
for the future not to sue; compare the theory of repeated games e.g. Gibbons, supra note 113, at 82 et seq.
213
 Compare above p. 45 with regard to the argument made by Bolton et al, supra note 179 (present/first period shareholders want 
to extract wealth from future/second period shareholders by setting managers incentives through equity-based compensation 
to boost the price). For this to work, they have to prohibit insider trading on negative news.
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delay of disclosure, absent insider trading. The market might have adopted our hypothetical 
already by punishing insider selling less frequently and severely than purchasing. Both 
readings are consistent with our theory. Overall, it seems plausible that the lower purchasing 
activity214 and the higher enforcement actions with regard to insider selling can be explained 
by the alleged differences of positive and negative information.
VIII The “Dirks-O’Hagan path”
VIII.a Efficiency Analysis applied
Our hypothetical suggests a reinterpretation of the case law by distinguishing between 
positive information (purchasing) and negative information (selling). Generally, the cases tend
to hold that insider trading on positive information is no different from insider trading on 
negative information. 215  This is mirrored in the literal reading of 10b-5 which refers to 
activities “in connection with the purchase or sale” of securities. However, prominent cases 
involving purchasing activity end in convictions (TGS, Newman, O’Hagan),216 whereas a 
major case dealing with selling activity ended in an acquittal (Dirks)217.
Even though neglected by the commentators, insider trading on negative information may be 
more widely tolerated than trading on positive information. Our hypothetical does not deny 
other distinctions recognized by the courts and made in the scholarly literature. Rather it 
emphasizes an additional element which explains why the case law is more coherent than 
214 This is consistent with the finding that in small companies there is no excess selling (Rozeff and Zaman, supra note 198, at 
41) because small firms are less often covered by analysts; Bhushan, Firm characteristics and analyst following, 11 J. ACC. & 
ECON. 255 (1989). Thus there is less “outside pressure” for an efficient insider trading regime. Moreover, if analysts 
evaluations are an important cause of overvaluations, as suggested by the literature (see above IV.c.ii), then small firms are 
less likely to be overvalued and insiders have fewer trading opportunities by selling.
215
 In re Cady, Robert & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910 et seq (1961); Carpenter et al v. U.S., 484 U.S. 19, 22 et seq (1987); SEC v 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra note 25, at 848 et seq; U.S. v Newman 664 F.2d 12, 16 et seq (1981); U.S. v. O’Hagan, supra 
note 2, at 651 et seq.
216
 SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra note 25; U.S.v Newman, supra note 215; U.S.v. O’Hagan, supra note 2. See also Chief 
Justice Burger (dissenting) Chiarella v. U.S., supra note 2, at 239-45.
217 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Kristoffel Grechenig Insider Trading (final draft)  March 2006
- 54 -
previously thought: positive and negative information. I will call this the “Dirks-O’Hagan 
path”.
VIII.b Purchasing cases
In the “purchasing cases”, the information would have become public fairly quickly without 
insider trading. Therefore, the marginal incentive of insider trading for disclosing information 
was low. Trading profits would have resulted in a mere redistribution for which the parties 
incurred expenses. In part, disclosure would have distorted incentives to produce information 
and thus would have resulted in an even bigger loss to social welfare. In SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, TGS explored an area in eastern Canada for raw materials. Four employees 
discovered a sizeable mineral deposit, which they reported to their superiors. TGS did not 
disclose the discovery but endeavored to first buy the land surrounding where minerals were
found. The four employees and the president of TGS bought stock and call options. Some of 
them accepted equity based compensation, without having reported the discovery. When the 
information of the discovery was disclosed the stock price rose. Clearly, TGS had to keep the 
discovery secret in order to buy the land at a low price, thereby recouping the information 
costs that it had incurred finding the minerals. However, it had no incentive to keep the 
information secret beyond that point. Therefore, the marginal incentive of insider trading for 
disclosure was virtually non-existent.218 Trading was largely redistributive, involving costs 
that were associated with the use of non-public information by insiders. Thus, profiting from 
short-time foreknowledge was likely to have negative effects on social welfare. Incentives to 
produce positive information were set through compensation.219 Similarly, in United States v.
218
 SEC v TGS, supra note 25, at 851-852. Rightly, the Court never doubted that the positive news would have been disclosed 
without insider trading.
219
 SEC v TGS, supra note 25,  at 851 (In the court’s opinion it is not true that “the elimination of insider trading benefits will 
deplete the ranks of capable corporate managers by taking away an incentive to accept such employment … adequate 
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Newman, 220 and United States v. O’Hagan, 221  insiders profited from short-term 
foreknowledge that was produced at a cost but with little or no effects on informational 
efficiency. As in TGS, it was clear that the positive information would have been disclosed 
without James O’Hagan’s purchasing activity; thus, insider trading as a disclosure mechanism 
had an extremely low incentive effect on the distribution of information.222 Moreover, the 
insiders in O’Hagan and Newman, similarly to those in TGS, misappropriated corporate 
opportunities. If insiders were allowed to do so, companies would have no incentives to 
search for them.223 In all the above cases, insider trading on positive information would have 
done little to affect the accuracy of stock prices, while setting negative incentives for the 
production of positive information.
VIII.c Selling cases
Dirks v. SEC224 was a “selling case” and ruled in favor of the alleged insider. Raymond L. 
Dirks was an analyst who specialized in providing investment analysis of insurance company 
securities to institutional investors. He received information from Secrist, a former officer of 
Equity Funding of America, who alleged that the corporation’s assets were vastly overstated 
as a result of corporate fraud. Secrist urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it publicly. 
Dirks’ initial investigation involving interviewing officers and employees was fruitful, in 
incentives for corporate officers may be provided by properly administered stock options and employee purchase plans of
which there are many in existence.”)
220
 U.S. v Newman, supra note 215. Newman passed along information about potential takeovers and mergers to his confederates, 
so that they could purchase stock of the target companies. When the mergers or takeovers were announced, the price rose, 
resulting in substantial gains to the insiders.
221 U.S. v. O’Hagan, supra note 2. James O'Hagan, partner at a law firm which represented a company in a potential takeover, 
came to know of the projected deal. He started purchasing stock and call options. When the tender offer was announced the 
price rose and O'Hagan sold the stock (and options) at a gain.
222
 O’Hagan started buying stock in August 18th, 1988; the public announcement of the tender offer was made on October 4th 
1988; U.S. v. O’Hagan, supra note 2, at 647.
223
 U.S. v Newman, supra note 215, at 17-18 (“In a tender-offer situation, the effect of increased activity in purchases of the 
target company's shares is, similarly, to drive up the price of the target company's shares; but this effect is damaging to the 
offering company because the tender offer will appear commensurately less attractive and the activity may cause it to 
abhor.”). For an efficiency analysis see Landes, supra note 35.
224
 463 U.S. 646.
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particular, with lower ranking employees who confirmed the allegations. Dirks then tried to 
publish the story in the Wall Street Journal but was rejected. He started discussing the 
information he had obtained with a number of clients and investors, some of whom sold their 
holdings in the company. Eventually, the stock price collapsed, trading was halted and the 
fraud was exposed. The Court held that Dirks did not violate the insider trading law because 
he did not receive a benefit from the disclosure, neither an immediate pecuniary gain nor a 
reputational one that would have turned into future cash flows. Where there was no personal 
benefit there was no direct and no derivative liability.225 The Supreme Court acquitted Dirks, 
even though he clearly provided his clients with inside information.226 Dirks v. SEC was 
widely criticized for being inconsistent and irreconcilable with existing case law.227 It was 
noted, and I agree, that Dirks did not provide his clients with information for mere altruistic 
reasons, as assumed by the Court, and that the Court’s “benefit test” was hard to apply in any 
case.228
More significant was the fact that Dirks traded on negative information that, otherwise, may
have remained secret for a relatively long period. Since Dirks brought Equity Funding’s fraud 
to light, the SEC only censored him as opposed to laying more serious charges.229 The final 
decision by the Supreme Court, holding that there was no violation of 10b-5, reflected this 
sentiment. The Court found that “the central role that [Dirks] played in uncovering the fraud 
225
 “… the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal 
gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach.” 463 
U.S. 646, 662.
226
 Fischel, supra note 4. 
227 E.g. Blackmun, J., Dissent in Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3273 (stating that Dirks’ laudable motives to expose fraud did not justify his 
means: “… even assuming that Dirks played a substantial role in exposing the fraud, he and his clients should not profit from 
the information … A person cannot condition his transmission of information of a crime on a financial award.” [citations and 
footnotes omitted]); Fischel, supra note 4; Mark K. Harder, Getting the federal securities fraud laws moving again after 
Chiarella and Dirks: A proposal for reform, 10 J. CORP. L. 711 (1985); Cox, supra note 155; Richard W. Painter, Kimberly D. 
Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams,  Don’t ask, just tell: insider trading after United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153 
(1998).
228 463 U.S. 646, fn 13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1, at Fn 93 (“Application of the "benefit" test 
will also be difficult. It would appear to allow an employee to give tips to individuals in anger or spite as long as he doesn't 
"profit" (Presumably he gains something-why else would he decide to release the information?) Tips to strangers are legal but 
tips to relatives are not.”) Harder, supra note 227, at 730.
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at Equity Funding … is an important one. Dirks’ careful investigations brought to light a 
massive fraud … But for Dirks’ efforts, the fraud might well have gone undetected.”230 Later, 
the O’Hagan court emphasized the importance of the fact that Dirks investigated fraud, when 
distinguishing its case from Dirks. 231  It thereby implicitly acknowledged that trading on 
positive and negative information was not identical,232 consistent with our analysis. However, 
commentators criticized the Court in Dirks for introducing such a distinction. Fischel argued 
that the court had misunderstood the tension between positive and negative information:  “to 
turn the Court's analysis on its head … disclosures that increase the value of the firm to the 
benefit of investors are illegal, while disclosures that cause the firm to go bankrupt are 
perfectly lawful.”233 But this seems to blur the distinction between incentives to produce and 
incentives to disclose information. Production, not disclosure, of positive information 
increases the value of the firm and social welfare. Once it has been produced, gains to social 
welfare come from the accuracy of prices; for the rest, disclosure is merely redistributive. 
Likewise, once negative information is produced, as was the case in Dirks, it should be 
disclosed in order for the economy’s resources to be efficiently allocated.234 True, disclosure 
of bad news typically results in a loss to the current shareholders of a firms. But gains to the 
229
 “Recognizing, however, that Dirks “played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding’s] massive fraud to light,” 21 S.E.C. 
Docket, at 1412, the SEC only censured him.” Dirks v SEC, supra note 2, [quotation marks and parenthesis in original text].
230
 463 U.S. 646, footnote 18. See also Wright, J., 220 U. S. App. D. C., 314, 681 F.2d, 829 ("Largely thanks to Dirks one of the 
most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed 
opportunities to investigate Equity Funding").
231
 Even though the court also uses other means of distinguishing, exposure of fraud seemed to have been an important element: 
“The information indicated that the corporation had engaged in a massive fraud. The analyst investigated the fraud, obtaining 
corroborating information from employees of the corporation. During his investigation, the analyst discussed his findings with 
clients and investors, some of whom sold their holdings in the company the analyst suspected of gross wrongdoing.” 521 U.S.
642, 662.
232
 Of course, like many other courts, it cited 10(b)-5, which refers to the “purchase or sale”, not distinguishing between the two. 
U.S. v. O’Hagan, supra note 2, at 651 et seq. Other courts have relied on Dirks when acquitting alleged insiders for trading on 
negative information, e.g. 34 Fed. Appx. 301; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8963 (memorandum).
233
 Fischel, supra note 4, at 139 („It is possible, in other words, to turn the Court's analysis on its head. There is little question that 
if Dirks had involved an insider's tip to analysts that the firm was about to announce record earnings, which resulted in 
purchase of shares by clients in advance of the announcement, the Court would have held that the insider breached his 
fiduciary duty and the analyst was a "participant after the fact." [footnote omitted] Disclosure of a fraud, however, is perfectly 
legal. Thus disclosures that increase the value of the firm to the benefit of investors are illegal, while disclosures that cause the 
firm to go bankrupt are perfectly lawful. Because the Court equated the social benefit from exposing frauds with fiduciary 
duties, it failed to appreciate this tension.”)
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firm’s shareholders from non-disclosure are redistributive and come at the cost of other, future 
shareholders that decide to buy from the current shareholders. The court’s analysis is 
economically sound and consistent with our analysis. It emphasized the utility of insider 
trading on negative information. Because negative information would otherwise have 
remained secret Dirks was paid for discovering and disclosing it.
VIII.d Potential objections
I have suggested that “insider buying cases” lead to a conviction whereas “insider selling
cases” result in an acquittal. However, some selling cases ended in a conviction (In re Cady,
Roberts, Diamond, Smith) 235  and an influential buying case ended in an acquittal 
(Chiarella236). On the face of it, this counters the proposed reinterpretation reinterpretation 
with regard to positive and negative information. Concerning selling cases, the presumed 
contradiction dissolves as one looks at the expected time of disclosure had there been no 
insider trading. The courts generally assumed that the information would have been disclosed 
fairly quickly without insider trading. If this assumption was correct, insider selling on non-
public information was not necessary for the distribution of negative information. In Diamond 
v. Oreamuno, insiders sold stock in September 1996 after having realized at the end of August 
that the net earnings had declined by 75%. The information was finally disclosed in 
October.237 In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., the stock was sold only a day ahead of the 
dividend announcement that communicated a reduction in the rate per share from 0.625 to 
234
 See supra note 153 and accompanying text for a discussion of insider trading as an incentive to make bad investment 
decisions.
235
 In re Cady, Robert & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969), United States v. Smith, 155 
F.3d 1051 (1998).
236 Chiarella v. United States (1980) 445 U.S. 222.
237
 24 N.Y.2d 494, 497; 29 A.D.2d 285, 302. Oreamuno, chairman of the board of director of Management Assistance, Inc. 
(MAI), and Gonzalez, its president, sold 56,500 shares at 28 dollars per share. After the information concerning the drop in 
earnings was made available to the public, the price fell to 11 dollar per share.
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0.375 dollars.238 In United States v. Smith, the insider started selling approximately two 
months ahead of the disclosure of the relevant information. As in the other cases, the court 
assumed that the negative information would have been disclosed even without insider 
trading.239 If the court was right in assuming that the information would have been published 
fairly quickly with or without insider trading, there is a strong argument in favor of the courts’ 
holdings. Of course, generally we do not know whether the information would have been 
published without insider trading. Had insiders not been able to trade, they might have tried to 
suppress the negative information. Thus, if the courts doubt whether information is disclosed, 
they might do better by taking the “Dirks-O’Hagan path”.240
In Chiarella, the insider was acquitted even though he had clearly traded on non-public 
positive information. Thus, the majority opinion in Chiarella clearly does not fit within the 
distinction here offered. We have not put much emphasis on this inconsistency for two 
reasons. First, the court based its decision on the instructions given to the jury and left the 
scope of the insider trading provisions open.241 Second, the adoption of Rule 14e-3, which 
was a response to Chiarella, contributed to the diminishing importance of Chiarella in later 
cases.242 It turned out to be Chief Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion that discussed the scope 
of 10(b)-5 which later courts relied upon. The fact that the misappropriation theory, as 
articulated by Chief Justice Burger, originated in a purchasing case is again quite consistent 
238
 Gintel, broker and partner of Cady, Roberts & Co., started selling shares on November 24, 1959. He continued selling after 
the board authorized the disclosure of the dividend reduction at 11:00 a.m. the following day. The reduced dividend rate was 
published at 11:48 a.m. by the Wall Street Journal on the Dow Jones ticker tape; 40 S.E.C. 907, 908-09.
239
 U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051. The court cites Richard Smith who left a voice message to one of the employees stating: 
“Anyway, finally I sold all my stock off on Friday and I'm going to short the stock because I know its going to go down a 
couple of points here in the next week as soon as Lou releases the information about next year's earnings.”
240
 The notion that emphasizes the time lap between trading and publication is supported by Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 
F.2d (1980) which held that sales eight days before the preliminary earnings forecasts were permitted, whereas sales one day 
ahead was not. The court distinguished the two cases by the TSC standard of materiality which was used by many other courts 
(TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438). This reading of the substantial likelihood test is quite coherent with 
our hypothetical. It generally assumes that non-public information used far in advance of the publication, fails the materiality 
standard, whereas trading shortly ahead meets the standard.
241
 “Because we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury, … we will not speculate 
upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a violation; 445 U.S. 222, 
236-37.
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with the general notion of our theory. Burger clearly had positive information in mind, when 
he discussed insider trading, even though not explicitly distinguishing between the two types. 
When making his arguments, he referred to buyers, never to sellers.243 In this context, he 
states that an “investor who purchases securities on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic 
information … quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at the 
expense of others.”244 Would he have made the same argument with regard to negative 
information if it had served to uncover fraud? As we know, Chief Justice Burger held in favor
of Dirks, a few years later, where insiders used negative information; thereby implicitly 
distinguishing between positive and negative information. Consistent with our theory, the 
misappropriation theory as laid down in Burger’s dissent was adopted in purchasing cases. 
The Second Circuit adopted it in Newman, the Supreme Court in O’Hagan.245
VIII.e The early common law distinction
On the face, both 10b-5 and most insider trading case law equated sales with purchases; 
however, taking a closer look, the judgments effectively distinguished between the two cases. 
The failure to distinguish was caused by early cases of modern insider trading law which 
referred to the “purchase or sale” of securities without further discussion, thereby blurring a 
distinction that was initially accepted in the law of trusts.
Cady, Roberts & Co.246 was part of this transformation. Here, the court acknowledged that 
distinctions between purchases and sales were made in common law but refused to apply this 
categorization to securities transactions. Interpreting the common law the court stated that 
managers were allowed to sell (i.e. trade on negative information) but not to purchase. This 
242 Harry Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: “Fairness” versus Economic Theory, 37 BUS. LAW. 517 (1981-82).
243
 445 U.S. 222, 239-45, mentioning buyers at 240, 241, 242, and 245.
244
 445 U.S. 222, 241 [emphasis added]. When summarizing his opinion, Burger again refers to “purchasing”; id, at
245
 U.S. v Newman, supra note 215, at 18; US v. O’Hagan, supra note 2. 
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was justified on the reasoning that they stood in a fiduciary relationship247 with the current
shareholders but not with potential future shareholders.248 The court relied on Judge Learned 
Hand who explained that when corporate officers purchase shares, they clearly fall within the 
prohibitions of the law of trusts, whereas for sales, there existed no relationship with the 
beneficiary.249 This is consistent with much earlier cases, such as Strong v. Repide, that 
marked an important step in extending fiduciary duties of directors to the shareholders, when -
at that time- fiduciary duties were believed to run only to the corporation. The court ruled that 
the director who bought stock from a shareholder when good news was forthcoming was 
liable. The director effectively misappropriated a business opportunity.250 Because the holding 
was based on fiduciary duties it was not surprising that this  case, like others,251 referred to the 
purchase, not the sale of securities. At that time virtually no cases were brought for trading on 
negative information, i.e. directors were allowed to sell but not to purchase, because it was
assumed that the directors did not owe a fiduciary duty to future shareholders. 252 Not 
surprisingly, later courts dealing with insider trading referred to “corporate opportunity” 
246 40 S.E.C. 907.
247
 Sometimes, later cases (e.g. Chiarella and Dirks) applied a fiduciary duty analysis but used this approach in a different 
context; O’Connor, supra note 46, at 330-333.
248
 40 S.E.C. 907,  913-14: “Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an officer or director 
may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members of the public to 
whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities 
acts.” 
249
 However, Judge Learned Hand refused to distinguish between the two cases in the given context. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 
2d 46, 49 (C.A. 2, 1951), cert. den., 341 U.S. 920 (1951): “When they bought shares they came literally within the 
conventional prohibitions of the law of trusts; yet the decisions were strangely slack in so deciding. When they sold shares, it 
could indeed be argued that they were not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his purchase made a beneficiary.” 
However, he went on in refusing to adopt this distinction in the respective setting: “That should not, however, have obscured 
the fact that the director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction 
to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was 
forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one." See also Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1978): “there has 
been a movement towards the imposition of a common law duty to disclose in a number of jurisdictions, at least where the 
insider is dealing with an existing stockholder … some even impose a strict fiduciary duty on the insider Vis-a-vis the selling 
shareholder.
250
 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). For a historical analysis see Dalley, supra note 20, at 1298- 1307.
251
 Fisher v. Budlong, 10 R.I. 525; Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362 (1903, 45 S.E. 232); Brophy v. City Service, 31 Del. Ch. 241 
(1949). Fisher, Oliver and Strong extended the fiduciary duties, so that director were liable towards the shareholders not just 
towards the corporation; see Dalley, supra note 20, 1302 -05.
252
 Clark, supra note 52, at 311.
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cases.253 Today, even proponents of insider trading acknowledge that insider may not trade if
they would entail misappropriating a corporate opportunity.254
The evolution of the insider trading prohibition supports the view that clear cases, namely 
those that involved the misappropriation of corporate opportunities and, as such, concerned
the use of positive information, were misread and extended to negative information without 
thorough analyses. This notion is consistent with the legislative history of SEC Rule 10(b)-5, 
that responded to purchasing, not selling activity.255 Maybe, the initial inclusion of sales in 
10(b) of the SEC Act 1934 is best explained by what now appears to be an unwarranted 
concern for speculative undervaluations, thus depriving the regulation of its main 
justification.256 Even though the distinction between positive and negative information was 
blurred and recent decisions have not explicitly emphasized this notion, it is clear that the 
common law, regulatory actions and modern case law prohibiting insider trading primarily 
had trading on positive information in mind.
253
 E.g. Brophy v. City Service, 31 Del. Ch. 241, 246 (1949) cites Guth v. Loft, Inc. 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 
Supr.1939) linking the insider purchases to the misappropriation of corporate opportunities.
254
 Fischel, supra note 4, at 135-36. Of course, Fischel argues that a mandatory prohibition is not necessary because the parties 
can prohibit such trades by contract.
255 When the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 based on the SEC Act of 1934, it referred to positive information: “[the rule prohibits] 
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities … The new rule closes a loophole … by prohibiting 
individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase; Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) [emphasis added]. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, Fn 32: “Apparently the Rule 
was a hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving intentional misconduct. The Commission's Regional 
Administrator in Boston had reported to the Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president of a corporation 
was telling the other shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant depressed 
prices, when in fact the business was doing exceptionally well.” [citations omitted, emphasis added]
256 One reason why sales were initially included in the SEC Act of 1934 was the fear for speculative negative bubbles; see above 
note 49 with regard to short sale constraints. Compare also Representative Sabath who stated that the "[n]ation-wide crash" 
was, in part, due to the "shameful manipulation of stocks" and that "the professional manipulators who were responsible for 
this criminal inflation would at the first chance take the other side and start a forced selling campaign by those who had 
purchased on their advice on margin." Conference Report submitted in House and agreed to June 1, 1934, 78 Cong. Rec. 
10248, 10267-68 (June 1, 1934). Stock bubble models have showed that undervaluations are not likely to occur (see supra 
Section IV.c.iii).
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IX Self-Regulation
One might argue that deregulation could lead to the same result as our regulatory
hypothetical.257 Because of market pressure, firms may adopt an efficient provision. However, 
there are arguments why a deregulated regime, allowing for an adoption of insider provisions 
including sanctions through private enforcement, would not lead to the same result. 258
Efficient deterrence requires imposing sanctions equal to the expected benefits. If the illegal 
conduct is difficult to discover, which is the case for insider trading,259 deterrence requires
higher sanctions. As sanctions exceed the personal wealth restraints, they lose their deterrence 
effect. 260  Because people have limited assets, there may be no possible sanction that 
efficiently deters the respective conduct.261 Thus, criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment 
and other restrictions on freedom may be necessary.262
Consequently, the ability of the market to adopt our hypothetical might depend on the fact that 
insider trading on positive information is currently prohibited. As far as the SEC and the 
courts sanction insider trading on negative information, outsiders seem to have chosen to 
allow it in many settings, while sanctioning the use of positive non-public information. If 
insider trading were allowed for positive and negative information, the market might be less 
likely to adapt a regulation that reflects our hypothetical due to a lack of efficient sanctions.263
257
 Carlton & Fischel, supra note 1; David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1449 (1986). Alternatively, one may allow firms to opt out of an insider trading prohibition, as Carlton & Fischel argue 
and Haddock & Macey refer to.
258
 E.g. Easterbrook, supra note 1, 333-335; Cox, supra note 155, at 656; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State 
Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189 (1995), at 1263.
259
 Fried, supra note 155, at 331-333.
260
 This is possible in spite of the marginal utility of money and the fact that future income can be taken away as well.
261 Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 
(1985); Shavell, supra note 47, at 544 et seq.
262 Easterbrook, supra note 1,  at 334. Compare also Dooley, supra note 14, at 25-27.
263 Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 334. furthermore argues that more resources than socially optimal would be spent for detecting 
insider trading, if the prohibition were solely based on private enforcement.
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X Conclusion
I have endeavored to show that insider trading on negative information is more beneficial than 
insider trading on positive information. Because negative information is often kept secret for a
longer time, the marginal utility of insider trading as a disclosure mechanism is greater for 
negative than for positive information. Because insiders have few incentives to disclose 
negative information, insider trading adds more than it does with regard to positive 
information. If insiders want to conceal negative information, e.g. managers want to conceal 
the failure of an investment, they have to agree not to trade on that information. Insider 
trading prohibitions allow the conspirators to credibly commit not to trade (if one deviates, he 
will be reported to the SEC or directly sued) and thus supports collusive fraud to conceal 
negative information.
I have applied the comparison of insider trading on positive and negative information to stock 
bubbles, as a form of massive mispricing that leads to an inefficient allocation of the 
economy’s resources. For several reasons, including empirical evidence, overvaluations are 
more likely to occur than undervaluations. Thus, the argument made in favor of insider 
trading, namely that it leads to more accurate (or informationally efficient) prices, primarily 
applies to insider trading on negative information. Because persistent overvaluations denote a 
massive loss to social welfare, insider trading on negative information could play an important 
role for welfare maximization. This includes the fact that performance-based compensation 
becomes a more efficient mechanism for aligning the interests of shareholders and managers.
Mainly, arguments brought forth against insider trading referred to profits from positive 
information. This includes the notion that insiders should not be allowed to trade on non-
public good news because they in effect misappropriate a business opportunity that belongs to 
the corporation. If insiders could reap the benefits of newly created positive information 
investors would have no incentives to provide the manager (corporation) with their funds.
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This inefficiency was often discussed in terms of “corporate opportunities” and was picked up 
in the context of insider trading long before the modern insider trading law. Historically, 
courts have focused on positive information, consistent with fiduciary duties. Because insiders 
owed a duty only to present, not future shareholders, they were generally allowed to sell but 
not to buy.
Modern insider trading law (TGS, Dirks, O’Hagan) has applied the basic notion of our 
efficiency analysis by sanctioning purchasing but not selling activity. Different from other 
cases that may have incorporated our analysis implicitly, Dirks makes an explicit reference to 
the utility of trading on negative information. Because fraud would have remained secret, 
Dirks was exercising a useful function by distributing negative non-public information. The 
“Dirks-O’Hagan path” showed that the same arguments were not applied where insiders 
traded on positive information.
